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Repositioning
Interpretive Discourse
From "Crisis of Reason" to
"Weak Thought"

Peter Carravetta

I

In 1979 there appeared on the Italian intellectual scene an
anthology of essays titled Crisi della ragione, an interesting and
stimulating ensemble of some of the most innovative voices of
the past two decades. 1 The book may not have been the most
startling cultural event of the late seventies, uncertain and grim
as those years were, but it did make the point on a number of
issues which had emerged basically after 1968, and it did give a
"turn" to discussions in many disciplines in the early eighties.
Focusing on a single theme but through the converging lens of
thinkers from different schools, Crisi dellaragionecan be perceived
as a spectroscopic picture useful in a number of ways. It can serve
as a preliminary corpus of texts from which to begin an inquiry
into, and a critique of, contemporary Italian thought. It is certainly
a representative and authoritative florilegium of first-rate writers.
And it can also serve as an introduction to the problem of interpretation because in certain disciplines (literary criticism, semantics,
1.
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art history, historiography, linguistics) a great deal of time and
effort during the past century or so has been devoted to redefining
approaches and views, that is to say, to problems of method.
Here we must pause a second and introduce the coordinates of
our study for, in fact, the problem of method brings us way back
to Plato, and the ancient diaphorabetween poetry and philosophy. 2
Let me say in this context that independently of its specific thematic or historical configuration, the philosophy of literary criticism
has always found it necessary to elaborate a set of structures and
assign functions with which it could undertake research into, and
for, knowledge (in its broadest sense). This is called its method,
the formally valid pathway of the questioning. The legitimizing
axioms or underlying principles are furnished by theory. Though
in the main one can assert that in post-Renaissance times the
tendency has been to play down the search for grounds or first
principles-with
some notable exceptions, like Utopistic and
Idealist strains-and to concentrate on the statute of the episteme
and its applicability, nevertheless, since ancient times philosophy,
and more pointedly philosophies of interpretation, have always
relied upon a method of sorts: dialectic, syllogistic, experimental,
inductive, and so on. Indeed, method precedes (and yet constitutes) praxis.
Method, however, will be found to be intrinsically related to
ontology, to a general theory of being which, whether explicitly
stated or implicitly supposed, can lend credenceand coherence
to those same indisputable epistemological moves that method
accords. In fact, as twentieth-century
thought-especially
in
phenomenology,
physics and psychology-has
revealed, the
method employed is never quite neutral or independent from
either the observer or the observed, thus partaking in the constitution of the ontological status of the object of inquiry. We can say
therefore that, in strictly philosophical terms, method always
harks back to theory, to a centering vision of being which coincides
with first principles. In our culture and time, theory is articulated
in language-again,
whether posited or "formal," or derived from
experience or "natural"-and
therefore is informed by a rhetorical
component, a style or a format. The linguistic rendering of the first
principles, the ontology, governs the articulation of knowledge,
controlling thereby the method on its way to possible or plausible
knowledge of the world or the text under scrutiny. We find then
that a given ontology requires given method(s), and, conversely,
that the epistemological legitimations of certain methods cannot do
without-and
can in fact lead us to-the underlying metaphysical
ground of critical discourse (whatever that might be: Aristotelean,
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Hegelian, etc.). I take it then as a provisionally valid assumption
that interpretive discourse is deeply concerned with method and
that, furthermore, method ought to be studied primarily in terms
of the domains that first give it life and legitimation, basically
science and philosophies concerned with the issue of knowledge.
That is why Crisidellaragionebecomes emblematic: by addressing the question of the present-day status of reason, of knowledge,
of the methodological project, it compels reflection on the principles, the commitments, the appropriateness of one's activity.
Thinkers in several different disciplines began to cast doubt on
the history and the projects of Classical Reason, above all they
wondered why the original presuppositions and procedures just
weren't working out as expected. What could have gone awry,
and how, given this impasse, this uneasy mood of intellectual
disarray, how do we resolve the problem, move on, or exit? In
turning to specific topics such as the question of legitimation,
authority, hierarchy, complementarity, distinctiveness and, of
course, method, scholars and thinkers also looked at the foundations of their own ideas and criticisms . And the foundations were
no longer there.
The critique came from within and without. From the inside
through some revealing studies done by philosophers of science
and especially those well versed in Analytic Philosophy. From the
outside at the hands of hermeneutics, as we will see in the third
part of this paper. Let's go back a few years. In 1975 Aldo Gargani
publishes a book titled Il saperesenzafondamenti,3 literally "Knowledge without Foundations," with the just as important subtitle,
"Intellectual Comportment as the Structuring of Common Experience." Here we read that, independently from the equally relevant
issue of whether scientific theories can make up a history of science, scientific thought has indeed manifested flexibility and richness of ideas, introduced operational techniques and voiced a
rhetoric of underlying motivations. In fact, scientific discourse has
each and every time forged its own grammar and lexicon, defined
the object of inquiry and so, finally, laid a structure or system to
guide research . But, says Gargani:
2.

In this sense, a scientific theory formulates statements about a
domain of objects whose definition is already given. 4

The overbearing [invadente]analytical capacity of Cartesian epistemology-grounded
as it was in Euclidean geometry-became
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an underlying principle of all "reasonable" explanations, of procedures and definitions, even of self-definitions. As Gargani puts it:
The organon of Cartesian intuition read an order of intellectual
evidences into a dominion comprised of metaphysical entities like
extended substance, thinking substance and God. The grammatical
status which Descartes attributed to these latter entities is responsible for an order of logico-metaphysical relations which have been
structured definitively from the beginning. 5

It is a case of method become ontology, for whatever could be
said about the nature of things, had to be said in that language,
with that grammar, within that community. 6 The implications of
this working model, which became codified later through the work
of Newton and Leibniz, are that at any given instance, a scientific
theory (orits "method") can be called upon to tell us what's "really
there" and how to go about knowing it.
If this is really what modern scientific thinking also harbors
as a tacit ontological impulse, then it cannot do any longer. First
of all, there's a historically demonstrable necessity on the part of
rationality and the arguments of scientific theory to reach out into
other disciplines, as well as other domains of reality, in order to
borrow the norms and rules (grammatical in both a literal and a
figurative sense), together with the values and social patterns that
would grant them acceptability, propriety and sophistication (like
higher mathematics, symbolic logic, very technical metatheories).
Moreover, operating at a level of formal abstraction, knowledge
may find itself with several possible grounding referents, or
perhaps without any. In fact, it turns out that knowledge is literally
without a formal ontological grounding, having rather developed
into propositional logic, strategies of appropriation (or exploitation), legitimation, language games, and fostered convictions of
True Understanding as derived-therefore
as inferred, translated,
removed-from
highly specific/specialized instances of (scientific)
discourse. Historically, says Gargani, a primary concern of
philosophers like Leibniz, Hilbert, Frege, Russell, and Whitehead
was to make sure the system had no flaws or, as Wittgenstein
was to say years later, when it all started crumbling down,
mathematics and metamathematics (Hilbert) were protecting the
body of knowledge from the hidden sickness of its own foundations. In this regard, the Italian philosopher writes:
Actually, the problem of foundations can be seen against the validity of mathematical procedures insofar as the corpus of mathemat-
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ical statements [enunciati]is not a system generated by the privileged
strategy of foundations. This is so because the scheme of foundations is entrusted to linguistic-conceptual strategies which seem to
be more problematic than the structure and procedures they were
meant to protect and warrant.
Such is the strategy or the assumption which entrusts some
"primitive" (elementary) concepts and propositions with the general authority or power to dispose of, within a discipline and from
the top down, an indefinite sequence of operations, of procedures
within a notational system. In reality we are dealing with a
methodological strategy grounded upon misunderstanding [fraintendimento]of our categorical apparati, of our inferential structures
and use of language. 7

This position is further strengthened when, in that same year,
Paul K. Feyerabend' s Against Method appears, challenging the epistemological presuppositions of the other, "strong" rational current,
the scientific one. Feyerabend demonstrates that any worthwhile
breakthrough in science has always occurred when the scientist
"broke the rules," so to speak, foregrounding the necessity of
redefinition of standards and procedures. This is what happened
when Galileo, bending Aristotle somewhat (for instance, on the
notion of unchanging, immutable sky), changes the type of observation required in order to validate a new paradigm (Copernicus'),
removes personal, subjective opinions, and proclaims and establishes that a community of scientists can and must be in agreement
on what will be considered true knowledge (creating thus a social
and moral paradigm as well, a language of exclusion and self-imposed authority which decides what's valid and what's not). 8 But
of course, as we go on to discover in many of the essays contained
in Crisi della ragione, it was precisely a highly developed and formalized version of the Galilean paradigm and the methodology
it spawned that prevailed in the sciences. 9

In the "Introduction" to the 1979 book Crisi della ragione,
Gargani returns to these themes once again, sketching a brief yet
revealing history of scientific thought and the theories of knowledge that inform it. Sometime during the period 1870-1900, reason
falters and stumbles, entering a state of "crisis." Specifically, with
Positivism two things start to happen. On the one hand, actual
empirical research turns up all sorts of data, structures and possibilities of investigation such that many sciences have to be literally
invented, new taxonomies devised, new utensils forged, novel
theories circulated. On the other, reason elevates itself higher and
3.
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higher, abstracts itself into an all-encompassing plenum preceding
nature, and is ready to offer a universalizing grammar or metalanguage guaranteeing the acceptability and institutionalization of
its practices as well as the deployment of its results. The abyss
between the two poles widens: the traditional metaphysical prejudice of unchanging substances, which has been relegitimated
by Newtonian physics as the theory of the conversion of matter
and energy, was shattered by Einstein's relativistic theorem,
whose definition of the universe was: "a formal legitimizing invariance with respect to the different observation systems." Space
had lost its traditional, almost divine primacy, time was lifted
from its Kantian hinges and there was nothing left to serve as a
priori for any justification or knowledge claim. The philosophical
consequences of this revolution within physics were far ranging.
If we allow for the inevitable distortion at work when translating
from one conceptual system into another (as Feyerabend had argued, all systems are incommensurable with one another), 10 the
letter Einstein wrote to Maurice Solovine (dated 24 April 1920)
can be used to enframe what is meant by crisis of reason when
its leading, paradigm-setting discipline finds itself hovering over
nothingness. Paraphrased freely: There's no notion in physics
whose use is a priori justified or necessary. A notion acquires its
right to be solely on the grounds of its clear and univocal concatenation in the linking of events, or of physical occurrences. Thus for
the theory of relativity the notions of absolute simultaneity, absolute speed, absolute acceleration, etc., are untenable, because their
univocal relation to experience is impossible. For the same reason
the notions of "plane," "straight line," etc., upon which Euclidean
geometry is founded, are confuted. Of any physical notion, what
must be given is a definition such that one can decide, by and
large because of this definition, if it can be verified concretely. 11
Thereare no absolutes:from within science the question of situating the new methods and fields of knowledge first required and
then demanded to look into and consider other areas, and in fact
we witness the emergence of a variety of proposals and responses
via the works of Bergson, Husserl, Freud, Dilthey, Simmel and,
Gargani should add, Croce. 12 Gargani's conclusions, after going
through the inconsistencies and aporias of twentieth-century logic,
is that today rationality [la razionalita]can only be given in two
possible articulations: as the construction and application of rules
and guidelines which we deploy to help out in the business of
living; and in the formal transition from one rule to the next in
exercising different operations, above and beyond the specificity
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or specialness of the matters dealt with. Thus the anthology of
texts on the "crisis of reason" announces that its explicit intention
is to chart the limits in the sense of the "external" parameters of
discursive reason, assembling a corpus of hypotheses and steps
towards alternatives which would bring out what the light of
reason had either blinded or couldn't see because in the shade. 13

Carlo Ginsburg's essay, "Spie, radici per un paradigma indiziario," later reissued in a book, 14 draws us closer to the relationship between the claims and failures of reason and the effects it
may have on interpretation. During the same period mentioned
by Gargani, 1870-1900, Ginsburg says that the "crisis" actually
stimulates a "methodological revolution" whose emblematic figure, at least in the art world, is Giovanni Morelli, a multifarious
and not atypically diabolical late nineteenth-century character with
many personalities and several legal identities, who furthermore
exercised a direct influence on both Conan Doyle and Sigmund
Freud. 15 Morelli' s insight was to devise a method for the correct
identification of an original canvas when the market for imitations
and travesty was burgeoning. Morelli discovered that in identifying and attributing an original painting, the critic had to direct his
attention to minor, discounted, unthematized details, and not to
the obvious formal themes and configurations, or even the idea
and poetic championed by the given author or critic. In the marginal detail one can capture a specific trait which expresses a
painter's relaxed, less vigilant and unsupervised execution. As a
result, nails, leaves of trees, curves of the clouds, the lines that
define an earlobe, roofs of houses, the hair of one of the persons
depicted and other such areas of the canvas become the object of
empirical research and speculation, fostering a methodology
which facilitates the identification, distribution and cataloging of
swerves, indices, or spie, as Ginsburg calls them, literally clues.
The method actually is not a method at all in the traditional,
Galileo-Newton sense of the word, because it must seek out that
which cannot be repeated, what has been said or done once, assuring thus authenticity, the truth and/or identity of the painting.
No need to recall at length how this "new" attention to minor
detail, to forgotten evidence, to casual expression can furnish
building material for a theory of dreamwork and the lapsus
(Freud), or the emergence of the detective novel (Sherlock Holmes
cycle), or, more sinister consequence, the foundation of a criminal
museum with its attendant "scientific" theories, like phrenology,
4.
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and what turned out to be a successful method in medicine,
symptomatology. The years 1870-1880 saw the disclosure in culture of an indexical paradigm, paradigma indiziario, literally of
traces, based upon a semeiotics(and not a semioticsbecause at that
time the referent paradigm was medicine) which claimed a different grounding or, just as important, a different discursive strategy.
This indexical paradigm, moreover, has ancient roots. 16 Drawing
upon the epistemologically oriented reconstruction of what life
might have been like for Neolithic hunters, Ginsburg asserts that
writing takes place before reading, on the basis of this description:
the act of deciphering and decoding the clues when stalking prey
(or an enemy) entails performing an operation which refers each
single time to that situation as the result of projections distilled from
an infinite number of precise, irrevocable details or vicissitudes.
Neolithic man had to abstract forward in time, as it were, on the
basis of many like situations in the past. There's guessing going on
constantly in the process of reading (and therefore in the process
of attributing meaning or significance to) those minor details or
traces, an ad hoc "divining" in the presence of unparadigmatic
statements derived from what in a later historical stage would be
called low, gross, unaestheticimpudenda, "droppings" scattered by
the wayside and ignored by a high, noble,unperturbedidea of reason,
whether Platonic or Aristotelean. Drawing also from the religious,
medical and legal history of ancient Mesopotamia and Egypt,
Ginsburg explains how this "primitive" form of knowledge acquisition had to be reported case by case, and at no time without the
mediating presence of another person, typically a doctor, a judge
or a priest. Though one important trunk of this most originary
hermeneutics developed or branched out into mysticism, religious
prophetizing and, at its worst, into political (authoritarian or despotic) legitimizing of what is true, and what can or cannot be done
in a society, another trunk was deprived of any likely ramifications,
and was literally pared off, suppressed: subjective, once-andforever instances of personal experience and contingent evaluations
were banned from the courts of reason: they had no attendible
protocols, or "method," to speak of. When Galileo's physics was
finally crowned the Grand Model of Scientific Inquiry, says
Ginsburg, any type of knowledge which necessarilydepends upon
qualitative, individual estimation of the facts at hand (and which
therefore rested on "untrustworthy, subjective" interpretation),
was debarred from speaking to, and about, truth. Readapting the
Thomist formula, individuum est ineffabile,it was decreed that inquiry may have a formal subject, a verifiable referent to talk about,
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but not an individual person's testimony in carne e ossa: of real
people one cannot talk! Two other disciplines seem to wallow in
this predicament: history and philology. As indeed is the case
with the medic, the historian and the philologist know their subject
of inquiry only indirectly or with strongly sfumato contours: they
too must rely, in fact, on traces, clues, conjectures, specific and
unrepeatable events, ever-changing "feelings" or "hunches" about
what they are pursuing, resulting in a strange relationship with
others. 17
If we now turn our attention to literary criticism, we discover
-interesting
thesis-that
its destiny was mapped out from the
start: because of the radical cut-off points constituted by the invention of writing in early societies and the invention of the printing
press in our more recent historical memory, literary criticism was
steered toward an abstracting, rationalistic and thus formalizing
practice. In its broadest sense, Ginsburg says, total criticism is
born with the first transcription of the Homeric poems, which
process required the erasure of an important series of experiences
concerning the voice, gestures, physical presence (its "performance" aspect?), tactile sensation and communication of the piece,
etc. 18 During the second stage, with the codified alphabet required
by the mechanical printing press, the physical relationship with
writing disappears altogether, the text becomes dematerialized
and all sensory perceptive referents are scraped off the interpretive
tablet. Today, in fact, a "primary" or "authentic" or "standard"
text can have no "physical support (Lachmann method)." With
intonation, calligraphy and now design gone, textual criticism
accepts the axiom that whatever counts is what can be reproduced,
and the possibility of quantification, standardization and distribution within other orders of discourse. And, once again, it is precisely Galileo who points out that philology must go scientific.
Recalling the epistemological figura both ancient and medieval of
the book of nature, Galileo suggests that nature can ultimately be
understood, provided we read the book properly, and to do so
one has to learn its language, which, it turns out, is made up "of
triangles, circles ... numbers and motion," in other words,
mathematics, and not the "smells and tastes and sounds." "Outside of the living animal," he writes, "these latter are nothing but
names." I feel this may help in understanding the emergence of
a little explored anti-anthropomorphic streak in the theorizing and
applications of science.
As Ginsburg sees it, this model goes tilt when the time comes
to account for events, situations and data which it cannot constitu-
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tively deal with. While Morelli unwittingly was deploying what
Peirce at about the same time called abduction, 19 and was therefore
attempting a syncretism between different approaches-a
science
of signs or semiotics; a phenomenology of perception and suspension of judgment; and finally fine tuning the laws that govern
hypotheses-the
British government was already very consciously
applying the new model. There was a problem at that time, the
historian informs us, of identifying each and every person (the
subjects, so to speak) in the Commonwealth. After several impractical solutions, Herschel stumbles on fingerprinting as the ultimate
fail-safe "method" of identifying everyone individually and thus
make for greater social control. It was applied to the Bengali colony
in 1880. The reasoning behind it went something like this: if
reality is opaque, if "all those natives look alike," there are specific
traits somewhere that mark the transition from chaos into atomistic
entities, which in turn can be introjected into a "rational" system
of causes and effects (we might even say of statistical forecasting).
Yet for Ginsburg, these fundamentally mute or expropriated forms
of knowledge-gathering (andknowledge-production) are distinctly
related to low [bassi]indices of understanding grounded on the
senses-the
casual glance, the gut feeling, the sporadic premonition, the "winning hand" and so on-and
are external if not
extraneous to the various articulations concerning a rationalversus
an irrationalepistemological problem. The sapereindiziariois a different kind of knowing, one which may influence a procedure such that
it becomes a "paradigm" (but it is not made exactly clear whether
this partakes in the Kuhnian process of substitution). Certainly
in Ginsburg's approach there's much of the old building blocks
still present, as inevitably some must remain. 20 But before proceeding with a critique of this particular exposition of the crisis of
reason, let us see how another philosopher writes the same story.

5.

Taking off from a highly emblematic book, Horkheimer's

The

Eclipse of Reason, Carlo Augusto Viano also backtracks to about
1870-1880 as the period when radical questioning of the claims of
reason began. 21 As a result, says Viano, all the rationalisms of
this century have had as one of their main targets a critique of
technical-scientific knowledge, especially as the latter burgeoned
into an all-enclosing totalizing process. From the point of view of
HistoricalRationalism, says the philosopher, modern science is the
result of a peculiar convergence between social-economic development and history as ideology. This position, basically predicated
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upon the dyad reason/revolution, is dialectically grounded upon
an even more overarching Reason of the Emancipated Subject.
Science must live up to its instrumental essence. Yet with the
crisis of the positivistic conception of science as a historically determining force, an alternative solution or development surfaces.
Science can also be thought of as the organizational capacity of
potentially available resources within a given social group or society and can actually concern itself with the proper formulation (we
might add, with the code or legal tender grammar) of conventional
theories, the elaboration of relations among data. Finally, science
is transfigured into means to fulfill disparate ends, a manageable
closed system of operations with a precarious if at all perceptible
communication with human nature. If knowledge coincides with
science, says Viano, it cannot host within its dwelling the language
of its legitimation of foundation because either a) scientific knowledge is applicable to diverse purposes and objects, orb) it has no
formal category of judgment to critique the ends to which it necessarily finds itself committed to. Ergo, we may conclude, the same
type of rational discourse can put man on the moon or destroy
Hiroshima: reason, in short, was split up again into two extreme
polarities, each seeking the impossible Grund. Yet reason also tried
to overcome these dichotomies by returning to Classical Reason,
thus incorporating its legitimation as coexistensive, coterminous
with different, "other" unquestionable (because unquestioned,
ultimately) frames of reference, the One, Nature, Truth, whatever
immutable eidos or value was available from the time before the
Galileo-Newton paradigm emerged. The various attempts at selfredefinition can be seen at work in dialectics, metaphysics,
rhetorics, semantics, linguistics, logic. 22 Disciplines which convened unanimously in either radicalizing reason's application or
in mortifying it in order to then repress and refute the tools employed by positive, scientific knowledge. On the other hand, however, it was precisely the coexistence and proliferation of these
disciplines that made it possible and indeed necessary to account
for the differentiation and inexhaustibility of possible theorems
which had,
and points of view, and a truly Modem Scienc~ne
23
moreover, also given us Darwin and darwinism -felt compelled
to call upon or invent a higher order of abstraction somehow still
rooted in reality. And here surfaces an interesting situation: reason
institutes itself as belief.Reason, in other words, reclaims its authority and power to speak not only for, but as the truth of things, by
falling back on extra-theoretical, extra-logical domains, a "strategy," we might appropriately say, that meshes in smoothly with
the demands and expectations of early imperialistic capitalism.
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Reason has now got itself into a double bind, because on one level
it still would like to make universal claims, statements about reality
which apply for all times and in all cases, above"lowly" subjective
claims; on the other level it must allow for the empirical evidence
of two apparently opposing or contradictory theories: there's an
electromagnetic theory of light, and a corpuscular or quantum
theory of light; there's a classical mechanics and a relativistic celestial mechanics contemporaneous with each other, actually depending one upon the other for the sake of conceptual
dialectic as well as didactic explanation. 24 The claims to Truth
must therefore be relinquished: the ultimate grounding of reason
as it evolved through the scientific enterprises of recent history
does not reside within the horizon of reason (which is to say in
its language) but outside of it, mainly in fields and activities whose
primary concern is not of necessity the legitimacy of reason or the
implementation of power.
From our perspective, this of course raises the specter of
complex problems related to the im/possibility of "translating"
from one discipline into another, the typical gesture of adapting
models and/or sets of data originating within a specific code into
a different set of models and data within a markedly different
system or code. It is the problem raised by (re)thinking of what
happens when the anthropologist deploys the metalanguage (its
idea of reason, in a sense) of the linguist, the political theorist the
language and principles of Marxian economics, the literary hermeneuticist the lexicon and historical referents of juridical
exegesis, the literary critic the values and adjectives of philosophical aesthetics. It is an issue to which the work of Kuhn and
Feyerabend have given impetus, and has more recently received
serious reflection by the diverse proposals of Rorty and Lyotard. 25
Viano' s conclusions on this point are similar to Aldo Gargani' s
perception (already explored in the 1975 book, Il saperesenza fondamenti) that foundationless reason seeks its ultimate justification
through the discursive practices of a specialized public, a consensus-gathering and -producing community which ascribes to itself
(to its definition of a system of protocolsand procedures)the right to
determine whether something is meaningful, "scientific" or useful, finally confirming a determinate power structure. 26 The development of these problematics through the twentieth century
has witnessed the repeated though subtle recourse, on the part
of science and rationalism, to the humanities--despite
the histor27
ically recent debate on the "two cultures" -for discursive "defences" that bear the imprint of ideology, or an "archival
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humanism," as Spanos would call it. 28 At the same time, however,
science is indeed humbled, albeit in a sinister way. For it is now
accepted that science (and its extension, technology) 29 can operate
effecting strong exclusivist closures owing to the quick availability
of several paradigms and/or instruments, refining itself especially
when the given venture entails that subjective evaluations be kept
under check. In short, the emphasis in scientific research is still
predominantly directed toward what can be produced, reproduced, packaged and sold.
Even if we side with the other influential trunk of reason, the
one that goes under the name of NaturalisticRationalism,we still end
up with the creation of legitimizing discourses dependent upon
belief, that is, more pointedly, a social discursivity predicated on
how believable a given-in this case: rational, scientific--construct
can become. According to Viano, Santayana and Whitehead aimed
at founding a rational ethics on the basis of the epistemological
indivisibility of reason and nature, which is to say on the idea
fused with or into the real. In this metaphysic, nature is total
process, and the subsequent theoretical and methodological conviction, that "it is the case that," sets itself up as the axiomatics of
possibility and eventually governs the availability of a legitimizing
rationality. It is yet another example of what our modern-day
Heideggerians, from Vattimo to Schiirmann to Derrida, would
very likely call "strong," logocentric discourse. 30 Subsuming the
sciences, Naturalistic Rationalism appeals to a mystical union of
the ideal and the real, banking heavily on the acceptance of unmeasurable principles and axioms and relying on intuitive participation and support. Reason will thus find itself changed into an
artificial, conventionalized grammar for a specific group of initiates
who may, however, loan its "services" to extra-theoretical, nonrational domains, or alternatively speak for them but not without
having first translated the rest of the world into its formal
categories. As Adorno would observe, it turns into ideology.
It should come as no surprise then to learn that within these
two leading and influential traditions of reason (or of the idea of
rationality), faced with irreversible and unpredictable social
changes, today an idea of reason, or even a more concrete rational
"system," can find acceptance ("success") on the basis of its "elegance" in higher mathematics (R. Thom), "style" or "rhetoric" in
criticism and psychoanalysis (de Man, Lacan, Derrida), "measurability" in laboratory sciences, level of predictability in any kind
of forecasting (from the weather report to the stock market), "accountability" in labor and management, and so on. It seems, in
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short, that validity and appropriateness(no matter how we define
them) are now more crucial concerns for reason and scientific
thought than were the "old" questions of truth or of foundations.
Viano doesn't say this and one may harbor the doubt that
perhaps-as
we shall see below-this state of events ought not
to be seen as indicative of a "crisis" at all. For Viano, instead,
having evolved into an instance of belief, science and the reason
that subtends it oscillate between a supreme (idea of) knowledge
and its actual existence within specific and determinate rituals and
conventions, though concerned also with what is "on the ground."
Thus reason in science can be understood as basically the attempt
to confer the form of universal knowledge to proofs and metastatements originating within specific communities, sharing particular
beliefs. 31
6. That an alleged crisis of reason would compel an explicit reflection on method was inevitable. It is what Salvatore Veca undertakes with the aid of precise historical references, arriving at the
conclusion that, in its most general characterization, the method
of reason strives to apply through all of time and in any given
circumstance. Traces of this pattern are present already in Plato's
Sophist(258d; on what to do and what not to do), and the Parmenides
(136e: on method as a path to everywhere). 32 But Veca emphasizes
that these ways (from the etymon of method) are now become
modes [modi] of actual itineraries that summon the monism of
reason to permit, to start up, so to speak, such an inquiry, and
nothing more. And yet even within this more "literary" reconstruction of the rise and fall of the idea of reason, what is brought
forward as either important or as perhaps partly responsible for
the "crisis" is the emphasis on the multiplicity of events, situations
and "knowledges" of the hitherto insignificant kind, traces and
debris from the "low" or debilitated sectors of experience. 33 It is
here that reason must open up, abandon its Cartesian monism
and take stock of itself as being essentially "plural." There's a
possibility advanced here that the modes of reason can indeed cut
across the aggrandizing universal methods, yet yield the discursivity needed to tackle previously unseen (and/or unseeable) aspects
of inquiry. For Veca, there's always a localized, individualized
teleology at work in any-dialectical-<:onception
of working
knowledge, though this does not necessarily entail an equally
strong claim on foundations: knowledge is working knowledge,
application, use, such and such a deployment of a modality of
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reason. Interestingly enough, Veca's own method-become-mode
of exposition consists in "suggesting" some images, often returning to the guiding background question: "What is your problem?"
and oscillating between monism and pluralism.
Giulio Lepschy' s short contribution to this volume centered
on the rationalism that informs linguistics and is confined to the
exploration of some precepts in Chomskyan theory-the distinction between competenceand executionor realization. 35 It concludes
by pointing out that the Platonism of Chomsky cannot prove the
existence of a real standard language and that ultimately the linguist's research is forever precluded from any perfectly selfexplanatory rational order of discourse. For Lepschy, moreover,
Chomsky's Cartesianism is to be identified with a "hard" or
"strong" rationality, especially as transformational-generative
grammar cannot deal with "weak," "soft" [morbide]formalizations,
like those arising spontaneously during a conversation or when
answering a questionnaire: the decision as to what is standard
and what is deviation is, in short, not grounded upon an immanence or the truth of reason, but rather upon non-rational or at
any rate extra-rational forces and situations.
Franco Rella' s contribution focused on the "discrediting of
Reason" as the result of its having for too long assumed that the
force, the re-cognizing capability inherent in rationality, is best
realized as differentiating procedures, as idioms, pathways,
logics. 36 This would lead-as indeed it has in the past-to the
instituting of instrumental formal orders, or sets, and eventually
patterns of social practices. This assumption undermines Reason's
own project of furnishing a cognitive picture of the world.
Moreover, reduced to mere instrumentality, reason cannot avail
itself of the prestige it formerly boasted with authority. Again it
seems that the question is turned toward the outside of its realm,
for Reason realizes itself as (as if) discourse, pointing to a sector
of interpersonal relations which strictly speaking is not primarily
of Reason, or of a scientific project in and by itself. Vittorio Strada,
in his essay "Interpretation and Change," 37 addresses the same
issue by charting the vicissitudes of the idea of reason through
Marxism and more sociologically oriented studies. Also out to
consider whether we ought not "revise Marx," by the end neither
Marx nor the reason supportive of a scientific method is recognizable: for Strada the transformations brought about by successive
interpretations (and therefore applications) have changedreason,
but for the worse and, if seen from a certain point of view, indeed
have "degenerated" into rhetorical ploys, politics, utopias. An
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unpleasant conclusion shared in part by Nicola Badaloni, 38 who
set out to explore the analogy between the production/demand
dialectic in economics with the referent/modality dualism of
logic. Here we learn that with the advent of linguistic games, there
sprouted on the contemporary horizon a number of logics which
insured the possibility of decentered discourses: the so-called contrafactuals become an ordinary exercise of reasonableness, and
reference mere (which is to say, "insignificant") presupposition
and linking.

Taking off from Gramsci and Freud in order to develop a
working interpretive scheme which would account for the
dynamics of an understanding [comprendere]which is at the same
time a changing [modificarsi],Remo Bodei 39 brings the issue onto
more tangible social and historical contexts, depicting a crisis
which is, after all, positive, something good, stimuli to lay to rest
what some earlier or more "primitive" form of rationality has
"conquered" for individual and society alike and made available
within a communality of relationships, in order to prod further
onward when "resistance," "dilemmas," and other "unforeseen"
situations develop. The gist of Bodei's article is very much in favor
of a relentless search for more strategies of investigation, provided
the old distinction between "high" or "elitist" and "low" or "base"
notions of reason is abandoned, and that thinking proceed with
a desire or a willingness to accept (integrate, deploy until new
"limits" are reached) the fact that changes of all types (perhaps
capable of cutting across established fields of knowledge) may be
revealed. There's crisis, says Bodei, when we realize that there
are still problems of inextricable complexity which we have not
yet solved, like violence, unemployment, exploitation, incurable
diseases, and so on. There's crisis because no one system or organizing principle can account any longer for the proliferation of
subsystems and highly sophisticated working models not really
available to everyone. There's crisis from an overabundance of
discoveries, of methods, of techniques due to the exponential
growth and metamorphoses of "knowledges" [saperi]. There's
crisis in the subsequent dilemmas created in reproducing it all
through schools, training apparati, means of transformation and
communication which in turn alter the very processes of cognition
and understanding. There's crisis because sectors of society, of
emerging countries which had hitherto no access to the voice and
formulas of knowledge "that counts," are now learning to talk
7.
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and think independently, and devising their own strategies of
reason while expressing different types of knowledges and values.
But all of this need not announce that humankind should plunge
into despair or apocalyptic skepticism or, worse yet, induce a
reactionary obscurantism. Quite the contrary, says Bodei; why
must we still insist on a clear-cut distinction between encyclopedic
knowledge and highly specialized knowledge, or between omniscient speculation and job-induced idiocy? Why must we choose
between the alternatives of a unique, monolithic, prevaricator
Reason and the "reasons" of unrelated, solitary, untranslatable
events or situations? Should it not rather be the case that we consider the relation between a greater and a lesser division of (scien
tific) labor, between a broader or more restricted translatability, capacity for renewal, "permeability" of knowledge and experience?
It emerges clearly that Bodei's discussion is straddling the
abyss between reason and history: on the one hand, the stark
concreteness of everyday life meeting the challenges of new roles
and rules and technologies, which demand on-the-spot pragmatic
evaluation and assessment; on the other a language of continuity
and development, which requires a collective memory, a belief in
a group or in redefined though ever-elusive sociality. There is, at
bottom, a trust in the regenerative power of dialectics. 40 In fact,
the title of the essay, to comprehend,to modify, actually reads understanding as a dynamic process, cum-pre-hendere,a bringing together which already requires and effects change; and modification
considered as autotransformation,
self-directed modifications,
using the implications of the reflexive ending to conceive of the
modifying as subject-oriented as well as object-determined. In
short, for Bodei, if only we had a genuine drive for "an education
and a potentially permanent state of self-education, " 41 understanding itself would be the transforming voice [comprensionetrasformatrice],which is creative. It follows that in this way the comprehension would not degenerate into blind alienating repetition
or specialization, but would rather make of the results of reason
"rational habits," and instill in the subject "an attitude toward
observation, reasoning, a searching which becomes a second nature." To conclude, there's a "crisis" if we insist on believing
reason is somehow detached from empirical, changing social reality and is therefore out of play, perhaps useless. But if only we
consider for a moment that reason is part and parcel with a social
project, then the "crisis" is something positive, especially for an
understanding which is also a conscious modifying of what's
around us:
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If its procedures do not reach deep into the social subject and the
institutions such that it can sustain anomalies, contradictions, darkness[ .. . Weimar, Nazism ... ], the power ofreason seems to end
when we actually dominate something, so that no special dose of
fortune or Providence or magic is required. These are the processes
we do in fact understand [si comprendono], processes of a full rationality which inspire a calm trust. If we do not succeed in preserving
or increasing the number, the visibility, the extent, the connections
among manageable processes [processicontrollabili],if the problems
which are accumulating in disturbing proportion are not directed
toward a solution, it is likely that one may start to perceive an
ailing sense of rationality. Trust and the credibility of "reason" are
socially bound to the successes, influences or progress of reason.
And of such trust reason in its turn is in dire need-much like the
banking system-in order to go on. Reason indeed needs trust
[fiducia]in order to go on. 42

It becomes then a question of wanting to remove the "resistances,"
and to seek "an understanding that wants to change and a transformation that wants to understand itself."

II
Responses to Gargani's anthology were not long in coming.
I'll refer to three of them in order to draw some preliminary conclusions and introduce the third part of this study. Mario Vegetti
observed that on the basis of these essays, it would seem that
reason, rather than being in a crisis, is actually alive and well. 43
What's more, a certain style typically associated with a" dominating
rationality" (in the "strong" sense of the word, centered upon the
values of truthfulness and the function of coherence, effectiveness,
power and extension) not only did not crumble, at the purported
origin-late
nineteenth-early twentieth centuries-but
actually
succeeded in consolidating its own hegemonic structures (I take
it Vegetti means sociopolitical, institutionalized structures). As a
matter of fact, argues Vegetti, what else are Levi-Strauss'
"rationalization" of anthropology, Lacan's "reasons of psychoanalysis," the legitimizing logic of neo-classical economics' approach to the ever-flowing energies of the market, and finally the
rationalizing of neopositivist epistemology at the hands of Carnap
and Lakatos, but evident proof that, though there might be
symptoms of uneasiness, reason is far from being in a crisis. 44 For
Vegetti, Ginsburg's sapere indiziario cannot hope of supplanting
8.
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hegemonic rationality (the two leading trunks mentioned above)
because his radical style of inquiry "lacks" the "terrible power of
abstraction," without which he feels no one can think and act
according to the various levels of comprehension (with reference to
values in general and truth-values in particular) and effectiveness
(planning and projecting in a real-world order of events). And,
he adds, without abstraction, there's no Marx. We cannot therefore
risk ending up like His Majesty's Bengali subjects, who found
themselves spoken by a more powerful language (a language effecting power) with the only alternatives being either imitation or
silence. Vegetti also observes, in a way not too distant from Bodei' s
perception of the same phenomena, that although reason has at
times become one of the articulations of power, it is not under its
exclusive dominion or constitutes its sole instrument.
Pier Aldo Rovatti, who co-edited with Vattimo Il pensierodebole
(1983), remarks on the gaze turned downward, this direzionebassa
of Ginsburg's analysis, which he considers something worthwhile
exploring. 4 However, he also expresses doubts concerning
Ginsburg's procedure~ since it would mimic "high" reason: the
predominantly mute knowledge furnished by the clue is read directly as a legitimate, decipherable semiotic system thus bridging,
without much historical support, the gap between the sign as
written and the sign as read and interpreted. For Rovatti what
remains essential in this enqueteis that the power of rational contradiction be conceived as capable of inhabiting previously inarticulate or unarticulated regions of subjectivity, and it is from there
that a promising start can be hoped for.

In his review titled "The Shadow of Neorationalism: Notes on
Crisidellaragione,"Gianni Vattimo observes that we are still dealing
with a family squabble, that the authors are once again debating
from "within" the metaphysics of classical reason and that, had
they not been so obdurate in their refusal to even consider the
history of hermeneutics, many more fruitful hypotheses could
have been advanced. 46 For Vattimo the main problem of the discussion is that, first of all, the discovery that reason can be a
strategy-a procedure largely occupied with practical needs--does
not necessarily mean that there are now several reasons, that
reason multiplies itself. Likewise, and perhaps above all, insisting
on the fact that multiple reasons have been identified does not
necessarily mean that we can now understand reason "as strategy
and interplay of forces ." We have here two branches of Classical
9.
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Reason each disputing the position of the other, but both convinced that one position can integrate the other. And it is the
assumption of this translatability without residue that the authors
do not address, for that would lead to the problem of language
[linguaggio](and not of the languages-Zingue-of
reason), of the
Grund, of Difference itself, and it is no coincidence that the names
of Nietzsche, Heidegger and Gadamer never appear, and Dilthey
is mentioned only in passing.
Vattimo isolates two camps: at one extreme, Vittorio Strada
and his loyalty to dialectics, which allows him to address the
problem of the many reasons as interplay between reality and
rationality, an internal exchange which is merely its articulation.
On the opposite side Franco Rella, who holds that forces are
simply given as different procedures, idioms, pathways, logics,
and that's that. The first position rehashes historicism, and thus
propounds a principled ideal of harmony between the rational
and the real; the second moves without any "mediation" (or "work
of the negative") toward the variegated field of idioms or metalanguages, taking the multiplicity as nonproblematic. If this assessment of the situation is valid, either one does not accept in its full
import the discovery that at the basis of reason (or reasons) there's
an interplay of forces (interests, passions, impulses, power); or
else one does not want to acknowledge the destructuring effect
this can have precisely because what is being explored is that link
between knowledge and interest, and that possibility of an irreducible multiplicity of rational procedures. This critique does not come
from the outside, says Vattimo, because already Marx had shown
how the diversification of the procedures of reason was related
to interest groups and power relations. At the same time, the
positivist and analytical traditions have always excluded the problem of power and interest and oriented their efforts toward the
multiplicity of language games. The result of not looking into the
interim space, of not considering the question of truth and of
language [linguaggio], entails the acceptance of multiple rationalities apt at consolidating established groups. To fend off the charge
of irrationalism-which
was important to all the thinkers represented in the Crisi-it is enough to acknowledge that language
strategies are the pell-mell expression of specific forces, like interests, pulsions, and so on. This view opens reason to the realm
of belief, as Viano has shown. The alternative position is to view
these "strategies" of reason as the unfolding of a dialectic
materialism as the essence of history, which is Strada's position.
A third possibility would be represented by Bodei's attempt at a
mediation between theory and praxis (derived from Freud and

PETER CARRAVETTA

103

Gramsci), where strategy is seen as the affirmation of a harmony
between the ego and the id such that the conflict modifies and
achieves a peculiar coherence; but this requires that the expressions
of the new strategies (whether psychologically conflictual or not:
Bodei employs Freud's theory as a model)be accounted for despite
the fact that a hegemonic, self-legitimating idea of reason has been
found inadequate. And here, according to Vattimo, Bodei must
make recourse to a Hegelian matrix, albeit through Gramsci, positing an "active rationality" which is rooted in the deepest social
habits of a social subjec( of the individual and therefore of society,
conferring historical reality to its attempt at unity, and demonstrating the tenability of" an understanding which is a becoming present
of the self, a knowing how to diligently enter the modifications
that are going on." 47 Vattimo observes how Bodei's "transforming
rationality" and idea of an "understanding which is a (self) transformation" comes very close to the hermeneutic position, but falls
short because of its underlying Hegelianism, its pointing to a
tautological glorification of the many ways of reason: thus, says
Vattimo, we are not beyond the idea of rationality as the global
horizon within which the single strategies exist. This only makes
a case for a Marxism which considers science, utopia and emancipatory praxis as indissoluble, the very truth of Marxism. The
real problem seems to be that we are still dealing with foundational
thinking, with an attitude that bypasses the issues of intuition
(for instance, in Ginsburg's essay) and of the capacity to know,
and finally does not truly address the Verstehen, the end result
being that we are still talking in terms of submitting new
"paradigms." Without the full support of the hermeneutic tradition, says Vattimo, the questioning of the prerogatives of reason
becomes a diatribe which cannot avoid either of two foundational
"strategies": a self-renovating rationality that needs some type of
historicism for support; and a rationality which is tautologically
exalted for its capacity to usher in new techniques and languages
(I take it Vattimo means "metalanguages": cf. idiomi molteplici).
All of this is not unlike the opposition between Marxism and
neoenlightenment of the fifties. Though it may not be the case
that these ghost-chasing quarrels have totally exhausted what they
had to say-Vattimo
will take up, under a new perspective,
Sartre's Critiqueof DialecticalReason in his more recent writings 48neopositivist science, Marxism and phenomenology (Veca, for instance) are yet engaged in grounding the experience of strategic
reason in a materialistc historicism whose ultimate, albeit unacknowledged, foundation rests upon Classical Rationalism.
For Vattimo, it is the hermeneutic perspective which can pro-
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vide some insights into the issues thus far discussed. Heidegger in
particular has addressed the issue of a "beyond" or "somewhere"
of language-without
ignoring the questions of a "different" rationality, which concerns comprehension, deciphering, historical
knowledge, and the analysis of the unconscious mind-but without accepting or even seeking a foundational solution, a metaphysical, teleological grounding. Moreover, says Vattimo, perhaps it
is time to address the irreducible differences between the analytic
perspective and the ontological perspective, despite the interesting
(I should say challenging) attempts on the part of thinkers like
K. 0. Apel to configure a "merger" between the Nietzsche-Heidegger trunk and the Wittgenstein-Analytic Philosophy schools. The
experience of the manifold does not in and by itself mean emancipation (much like the opposition reason-reasons does not simply
coincide with the opposition truth-power), at least until hegemonic
models [schemi]crumple. Moreover, the dissolution of the purported unity of the I [io] does not grant access to the other perspectives
(to "Difference," we might even say) which cannot be reduced to
a mere acknowledgment of the given differences, deploying them
"iuxta propriaprincipiawith a certain technological fanaticism. "49
10.

If we now consider the terrain just explored from the perspec-

tive of interpretive discourse, it can readily be seen that whether
it is good or bad, real or fake, a crisis of reason affects directly
and immediately the method involved in research, extending its
influence to the very language (better: metalanguage)required to
explain itself logically or coherently. Questioning the statute of
reason has made us aware that the methods of inquiry sanctioned
by science and rationalist philosophies are living precarious lives,
because though they can legitimately (that is, formally) guide the
critic to a presupposed locus of knowledge, they cannot any longer
pretend to extend their validity to other domains not formally (or
"rationally") defined. Domains in which the linguistic and the existen-

tial moment precedethe metalinguisticformulation.
Method (by which I mean here the methods of reason or
rational methodologies) can be now regarded as a two-pronged, bilateral construct, a dichotomous-enabling structure, a rhetorically
bifurcate figura: at one end, the socially and historically verifiable
extensions and transformation, the how and the what of method
(from utensils to multiplication tables to, in short, its becoming
"instrument") have unquestionably affected reality and the social
structure, making a "difference," so to speak, in very concrete
terms, especially as it accepted and in turn shaped technological
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development. At the other end, this explication-turned-concretization has each and every time needed an explanatory rhetoric, a
restricted vocabulary, a few concepts for the why things were what
they were and why it couldn't be otherwise. It would be easy to
assert at this point that we are dealing with a (theoretical and
historical) case of bad conscience legitimizing the exploitation of
the means of production and so on, but that is not what we are
pursuing here, and would mean missing the point. Even the Marxian paradigm cannot do without a set of projective possibilities of
realization (in the worst cases, utopias), which means that its
method is articulated as praxis with constant (though often tacit)
reference to an Ideal to Come, a One or Truth, which ultimately
is a theory of history, a theory of man. In other words, it too leans
on theoriaas ontological Grund, a (often mystifying) Transcendent
Value or Idea.so
Rather, it is this indissoluble connection between method and
theory that in fact emerges as a basic issue in the possibility of interpretation, and which needs further exploration. Method, we saw,
can be understood as a set of procedures and patterns that lean on
epistemology, how we know and what this knowledge is; theory,
on the other hand, can be understood as principles or Grand
View, God or Master Paradigm, from our perspective: (an idea
of) the essence of being. And whereas method can have a more
variegated and eventful existence, since as explication and enabling
function of research and criticism it makes up the bulk of our
written history (history of knowledge or cognitive claims), theory is
in general less time-bound and in fact the majority of theories
(especially in theology, philosophy, aesthetics, poetics) always
preach ("predicate") from atemporal, eternal heights.s 1 Vattimo's
critique, for instance, can be seen as an appeal to scientific-minded
or rationalist thinkers to reach out beyond the method(s) of reason
and to reconceptualize instead its theoretical presuppositions,
most of which will be found to speak, despite themselves, a foundational, metaphysical, "strong" type of language.
Paradoxically, rationalistic and scientific methods of inquiry
require, by virtue of their formal internal exigencies, a beliefin a
contextual extra-rational or non-scientific dimension of existence. s2 In and by itself the method, the instrument, is nothing. If
we make an effort to recover its co-originating world-view impulse,
in short its theoretical matrix, then perhaps the "path" "in between" and "from ... to" can be illuminated, and permit one to
see that certain things are indeed there, but at the same time that
other things, other pathways are, almost of necessity, left out in
the shadows. Method as the expression of an idea of reason has,
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in Modern Times (since Galileo and Descartes), given sense to the
expression "Return of the Same." 53 In this sense, dualistic,
rationalistic, interpretive discourses are severely limited, because
they still split up their "subjects," they continue to divide the
world into twos, a plus function and a minus function, a "method"
still operative in Francesco Orlando's reading of Freud. 54 A
thorough analysis of the "crisis" of reason at the tail end of the
Modern Era and its implications for interpretive discourse cannot
be carried out unless we turn also in due time and place toward
transcendental phenomenology, since there we find thematizedwith the rigors of a transcendental logic, the epoche,and dialectic
-all the areas that rationalist philosophy and scientific thought
have systematically excluded: history, aesthetics, politics, arts
and literature, consciousness, language [linguaggio], existence,
values. 55 In Italy, at least, this constitutes a most important chapter, since the Kant-Husserl tradition as interpreted by Antonio
Banfi was among the first to oppose any serious resistance to the
idealist-historicist cultural hegemony of Croce and Gentile, becoming in fact a major trunk of philosophy for a short period until
the mid-sixties. 56 But that would require a separate study. For·
now, it appears that after the great late nineteenth-early twentieth
century foundation-shattering" crisis," Reason (and, with it, therefore, rational methods of inquiry) has evolved, especially in the
last twenty years or so, into "strategies" 57 "modes," "statements
about the observed regularities. "58

III

If the Crisis of Reason made us aware of the uncertainty and
lability of scientific and epistemological constructs, Weak Thought
brings to the foreground the limits and dilemmas of ontology and
of Western metaphysical thinking in general. 59 And just as some
of the philosophers in the Crisis book attempted nonetheless to
recover from the debris of Reason trapped intuitions and unnoticed
stylemes in view of a "positive" or at any rate "rehabilitating"
notion of reason(s)-and
therefore of method(s)-so
in the Weak
Thought anthology, for every damaging blow to the foundations
and towers of Metaphysics, an equal amount of care is devoted
to rethinking and reshaping the question of mankind's essential
being. However, this means the terrain to be explored is of a
totally different nature; namely, we are now dealing with ontol11.
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ogy, not with epistemology. In the context of this study, the link
between the two groups of readings is not historiographic in the
strict sense-though
some connections will suggest themselvesbut rather emblematic, aiming at a crossing over, an interference,
a repositioning of the question of interpretation. How is this to
be understood? Let us backtrack a moment.
We began by stating that interpretive discourse-and,
more
specifically, critical "methods" -cannot be "properly" or" authentically" articulated without taking into account their "theoretical"
presuppositions. We saw how approaches to a text (or to facts,
processes, etc.) that bank heavily on rational-scientific methods
of inquiry are mired in a general crisis; that is, they can no longer
make universal claims to truth, nor can they ignore some extramethodical, non-scientific referents under risk of being demagogic
or mystifying. We also saw how the theoretical, which here is
made to coincide with metaphysical presuppositions, kept on surfacing, manifesting its linguistic qua linguistic (i.e., "rhetorical")
nature, and how only a very loose, local and "consciously instrumental" idea of reason has any viable use in the technological
epoch. The "connection" with perspectives that originate in the
"theoretical" or the "metaphysical" (a move that could rightly be
considered improper, illegitimate, or disrupting from the point of
view of rationalist philosophy or the philosophy of science) is
motivated by an argument parallel to the observation made by
Vattimo above concerning the total disregard on the part of deconstructors of classical reason for the hermeneutic perspective, which
had already dealt with some of the same problems. In fact, the
thinkers of the second book are concerned with metaphysical issues
from the vantage point of a general theory of being. But they do
so by critiquing from the inside, as it were, the very notions of
metaphysics, theory, truth. As a parallel inquiry to Crisisof Reason,
the Weak Thought anthology could also have been called Crisis of
Metaphysics. The difference is that, whereas in the first book
philosophers explore and critique the heritage of (Modern)
Reason, offering little-with a few exceptions 60-by way of alternatives, in the second book the "crisis" is a "given" from which
to take off on a variously articulated path called "weak ontology."
We are, however, on the other side of the theory-method relation
postulated at the beginning; we are talking from a terrain Crisis
of Reasonleft untouched or did not address adequately. With reference to our framework, we need to look into a) how "weak ontology" deals with the interconnected issues of a no longer tenable
b) how
model of classical-Le., metaphysical, logocentric-reason;
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it adresses the problem of being and with it the question of theory;
and c) how this affects interpretation as a whole.
12. Paradoxically, the thinker who furnishes us with some preliminary steps toward a re-positioning of interpretive discourse is
Umberto Eco. I say "paradoxically" because, up to 1975, just four
years before Crisis of Reason came out, Eco's work would have
been considered the ultimate exemplum of what a coherent,
"strong," rationalistic approach to knowledge is like. His Trattato
di semioticagenerale61 is fundamentally a summa centered on the
sign and the code, aimed at explaining all systems of communication and signification. Its real and ideal precursors are Aristotle,
Aquinas, Locke, Peirce and Morris. This is the Eco of epistemological closure, the "closed" systems of comprehension. In his review
of Crisis of Reason,62 Eco still propounds the instance of the modus
ponens as the minimal enabling position from which to articulate
any discourse on knowledge as well as "belief" in that knowledge.
But during those years he also explores and expands the possibilities of the two external poles of the communicative-signifying
chain, that is, the sender and the receiver. Thus, what in the
Trattato was postulated as "model Q," 63 the "interaction of codes
and the message as open form," 64 and, in terms of signic production, the "continuum of transformations," 65 in his subsequent
book, Lectorin fabula,66 is further developed in terms of "unlimited
the recurrence of analytic,
semiosis," 67 and in general--despite
empirical and isotopic models-towards
a pragmatic and vaguely
more "hermeneutic" approach. We might say that the Stable (predictable and normalizing) Dictionary Semantics of the world is
making room for an Unstable (rhyzomatic, historical) Encyclopedia
Semantics. This is evident in Semioticae filosofia del linguaggio,68
which devotes ample space to "sign and inference," Peircian "abduction," and the problem of the symbol. There's a hint of developments to come at the end of the first chapter, where Eco writes:
"The preliminary condition of the sign is not therefore that it can
be substituted (aliquidstat pro aliquo),but that it can yield a possible
interpretation."69 In a sense, he is moving away from Hjelmslev
and Morris and working his way back to Peirce's idea of the interpretant, reopening the nature of the dichotomous sign to a trichotomy, one of the "included middle," so to speak. 70 Subsections
from Chapter Two of Semiotica,which dealt with "Dictionary versus Encyclopedia," with the addition of a short introductory piece
on "strong" semantic models and a concluding one on labyrinths,
appear as the third essay in the Weak Thought anthology.
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The essay explores why a "strong" form of knowledge organization, such as a dictionary, is "theoretically" doomed from the
start, and why an encyclopedia-type of semantics is more likely
to account for a real-world context of signification. The argument
rests on a critique of the premise, typical of axiomatic, hierarchic
models like Chomsky's or Katz and Fodor's, according to which
it is possible to construct a model language with a definite set of
synonymic possibilities which would account, through homology,
for an infinite number of possibilities present in natural languages.
This type of semantics deploys the same logic that the authors of
Crisis of Reason decried as insufficient, authoritarian, delimiting.
On the other hand, an encyclopedia-type of semantics undermines
the very possibility of the ideal dictionary. The encyclopedia is
governed by the Peircian principle of interpretation and by unlimited semiosis; it is not concerned with the object itself as much
as with the content, which is ever interpretable. As a result, it
constitutes a "weak" semantic model because "it subsumes the
rules of signification to the continuous determination of context
and circumstance ... and incorporates pragmatics"(75). We cannot dwell here on Eco's analysis of Porphyry's Isagoge,71 and must
proceed to his final assessment:
The encyclopedia does not furnish us with a complete model of
rationality(it does not reflect in a uni vocal way an ordered universe),
rather, it supplies rules of reasonableness,that is to say, rules that
allow us to decide at every step the conditions that warrant the
use of language in order to make sense [rendereragione]-according
to some provisional criterion of order-of a disordered world (or a
world whose ordering criteria escape us). (75) [emphasis in original]

This position allows Eco to recover, among contemporary theories
of interpretation, the value of the rhyzomatic approach for, in
fact, with it "one gives only local descriptions"(78); moreover, one
is now able to cast a backward glance at history and view the Enlightenment not so much (or any longer) as the triumph of rationality but as the paradigm of "weak thought" itself, a thought of

reasonableness.
Therefore, insofar as interpretation relies on approaches inspired by rhyzomes, encyclopedias and labyrinths (as networks),
it stakes out territory for a thought whose claims must be conjectural and contextual. Moreover, it must somehow make room for
some unspecified will, conscience or drive because we saw that
thought strives for a reasonableness that monitors intersubjectivity
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in order to avoid yielding either to skepticism or to solipsism (79).
We can then say that all these cognitive-interpretive models partake, and represent prime examples, of "weak thought" (though
still coming from the rational and epistemological-i.e.,
methodic-side of the theory-method equation).
Behind Gianni Vattimo' s notion of "weak ontology" there's
a long excursus into and reflection on the several possibilities
disclosed to thinking in the wake of Nietzsche and Heidegger, to
whom he has constantly returned to for the past twenty-five years.
Of particular interest to us in this context are some of the essays
contained in Le avventure della differenza,72 in which Vattimo
analyzes and critiques Gadamer, Derrida and Deleuze, proceeds
to read Nietzsche as the philosopher of difference (as recalling,
i.e., Heidegger's, not Derrida's, notion of difference), and finally
sketches the possibility of a thought which effec~s a "de-grounding" [sfondamento]with respect to the history of being, a necessary
gesture to pave the way for weak ontology.
Concerning Gadamer's ontological hermeneutics, Vattimo observes how several of its tenets are really metaphysical, "strong"
and totalizing. The claim "being that can be understood is language," for instance, ignores or reductively appropriates two areas
which Heidegger had merely pinpointed as problems:namely, the
unresolved relationship between revealing/covering up in the history of being, and the difficulty of handling the copula. In Ga dam er
these are resolved in the description of the structures of being
and implanted in a theory of the structure of human existence to
whose finitude there corresponds the infinity of the process of
interpretation (36-38). But this raises another two-pronged issue,
for if the problem of historical malaise (as sketched by Nietzsche)
consists in the rupture between theory and praxis, ontological
hermeneutics does not overcome it by positing the coincidence of
being and language (or: being = language), because this presupposes a continuum-albeit
subject to ever-different interpretations-of a stable structure, in effect rehabilitating the Hegelian
(and in some ways Diltheyian) paradigm of the itself and the for
itself that governs the phenomenology of history, and the strict
coincidence between doing and knowing, praxis and theory. Thus
the overcoming of metaphysics becomes a new canonization of
history in which the pure passing of what is inessential entails,
ultimately, the non-coincidence between existence and meaning
(40). The second horn of the problem concerns the fact that in the
formula "being that can be understood is language," there's no
13.
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room for an idea of language which is also a pure instrument of
communication, signs that need decipherment. In an excess of
zeal, Gadamer' s anti-positivist thrust in Truth and Method makes
being the sole and universal task of hermeneutics. Yet the fact
remains, Vattimo writes, that
the Western tradition has handed down, at least as its most recent
consequence, a conception of language as sign understood in its
effective capacity to refer "objectively," lending itself to an experience which is above all a deciphering. (37)

It follows then that ontological hermeneutics as a general theory
of interpretation based on the experience of the finitude of man
does little to account for those "inessential" aspects which do not
conform to the requirement of being= language, and leans heavily
towards metaphysics, towards grounding principles, leaving concrete facts, signs, praxis itself in oblivion. As ulterior proof, Vattimo
observes how Gadamer offers little in the way of "methodical"
indications to assess the values of the actual expressions which are
typically recognized as embodying the linguisticalness of being. 73
The way toward post-metaphysical thought is to be sought
in the space between theory and praxis-we might say, in line
with our theme, between theory and method-a way which would
allow for a reconceptualization of the issue in terms of experience.
Only Nietzsche, Sartre 74 and Heidegger seem to have pointed
towards new horizons. The questions the philosopher asks in
concluding this essay address the tasks he perceives as crucial to
our epoch:
Is it possible to have historical action that bears from the start its
meaning, without the threat of the inertia of counterfinality? Is it
possible to have interpretation, or living with symbols, that is dance
and play as in Zarathustra, and not permanent resurgence of the
transcendence of meaning, erring, exercise infinitude? Is it possible
to have production of symbols not based on the repression-sublimation structure? Is it possible-in
this light-to overcome meta physics? (43)

It shouldn't be overly difficult, given these premises, to
foresee how the "thought of difference," associated with Derrida
and Deleuze, falls short of the mark posted by the questions.
Without gett ing into Vattimo's textual critique, we learn that the
unnameable "difference" between being and beings is continually
swallowed up by the effective differences that constitute the chain
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of signifiers, revealing it as simulacre. The play involved in deconstructive maneuvers in search for the traces exposes the undecideables-pharmakon,
supplement, hymen, differance itself and
others-which,
on the one hand, do not correspond to an originary
fractured structure, being ultimately the product of an arbitrary
choice, a toss of the Mallarmean dice that sets them up as opposites
without foundations, while on the other this locus of difference
is a non-place, pure trace of an original that cannot ever be given
or named, making the undecidable itself something more than
opposition: it turns into an insurmountable dead end. The result
is endless, almost delirious substitution and, as such, a critique
which "makes no difference." We are left with no option other
than to accept the destiny of gnawing away at the margins of the
metaphysical text, rewriting it in a contemplative, parodistic mode.
Yet parody is the only way of "making difference" in a situation
in which any differentiation is always only a process of duplication
of the trace, where in short the absolutization of difference has removed any possibility of differentiation. But, Vattimo
observes, "parody is defined only as a position of consciousness,
which is a classic element of the metaphysical armor of the thought
of presence" (157-58). There is in these two thinkers a metaphysical
congealment of the notion of difference which displays itself in
stark counterposition to Heidegger's ontological difference as the
happening or event of being and its historicity:
[if] difference as archstructure is outside of history, and does not
happen ... then in this aspect it once again represents a return
to the most classical qualifying trait of metaphysical thought,
namely, eternity (the fact that we are dealing with the eternity of
the trace, or a non-homogeneous eternity marked by unfulfillable
absence, does not constitute an alternative element with respect to
metaphysics). (158)

The critique of Deleuze follows similar lines: a philosophy of difference that glorifies the duplication of the simulacre on the basis
of an unrestrained libido, a "body without organs," can be traced
back to a Bergsonian vitalism which is forever rTeating variations
of the several levels that make life possible. 7 What is left unthematized, says Vattimo, is Heidegger's Wesen as always already
Ereignis of a differential relation between being and beings: to
name the difference means "to think difference as difference" 76
not as a repetitive act of consciousness. The fear that by calling
difference ontological difference is to situate it again in
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metaphysics is misplaced, for it leads to emptying difference of
any content and ultimately to making it irrelevant:
If we are not dealing with a difference between being and beings,
we are left with a pure and simple-and metaphysical-affirmation
of the non-homogeneity of what metaphysics calls real, one, being.
This non-homogeneity-which
differentiates, confers, displays itself-is given once and for all. Confronted by it, the only thing
that can change is the attitude of consciousness: rather than assuming being as homogeneous, it becomes a question of deconstructing
it. But deconstruction does not partake of difference, which, as
archstructure, is always already displayed and available. (162)

The status of Deleuzean deconstruction is therefore, according to
Vattimo, again in line with speculative, representational thought,
grounded in the correspondence between being and thought.
This brief parenthesis was necessary to avoid confusing ontological hermeneutics, deconstruction and weak thought. How
should the ontological difference be thought, then? And does it
have an effect on interpretation? According to Vattimo, we must
turn to what Heidegger called An-denken, rememoration, recalling,
memory: "An-denken is the thought which, insofar as it recalls
difference, recalls being" (163). Vattimo insists that such a recalling
shifts the emphasis on the way being-there relates to difference,
and as such involves man, "concerns him in the Brauch, in the
usage 77 with which Heidegger translates Anaxirnander' s chreon"
(163).78 But usage is essentially "the distribution of presencing
into disorder. Usage conjoins the distribution." 79 More than that,
in this notion of "usage" there is implied a different type of hermeneutics, for what is handed down "is in each case given in its
while in unconcealment. "80 If we link this observation with other
passages from Vattimo's works 81 -for instance, his underscoring
in the writings of Nietzsche the decline of subjectivity 82 and the
necessity to rethink the Zarathustrian Uebermensch as an "ever in
becoming" "man of the beyond" 83 -we begin to see the emergence
of a post-metaphysical "weak thought." Let me add that elsewhere
Vattimo speaks of the "play" involved in interpretation, suggesting that cognizance of a certain "tolerance" between systems and
networks of signs and sign codes, a "flexibility" which permits
precisely for a "lingering" and "usage," as we saw above.
What takes shape before us is a notion of interpretation informed by several conceptual referents none of which is "founding," Grundliche and therefore totalizing. Moreover, these ele-
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ments are not hierarchically organized, but constitute rather a
loosely drawn map of intellective vectors. Reading a text means
relating oneself to it, and any knowledge to be gathered cannot
be translated by means of a single method and/or acccording to
one general grammar. Reading a text on the basis of a logos erring
through the concretions of time (monuments, ornament, canonic
texts, specific traditions) means being aware of an existential capacity which has not been fully realized. As we read in the essay
"Dialectics, Difference, and Weak Thought," with reference to
Heidegger's Vom Wesen der Wahrheit, a weak ontology holds fast
to the belief that verification and stipulation of the truth always
take place in a freeflowing interplay among people, cultures, languages, generations, and on the basis of which we can say
no one ever begins from zero, but always already from trust, belonging, bonds. The rhetoricalhorizon of truth (which we can call hermeneutical as well) is constituted in this free yet "impure" way,
similarly to the common sense Kant speaks of in the Critique of
Judgment. It is the bonds, the manners, the personal ties that make
up the substance of pietas. This inscribes, together with a rhetorical
"history" of logic or "weak" truth, the basis for a possible ethic in
which the supreme values-those that serve as good in themselves,
not with regard to anything else-are the symbolic formations, the
monuments, the traces of the living (everything that spurs interpretation; an ethic of "goods" before an ethic of "imperatives." (26)

And here we can close in on three important, distinctive traits.
Any epistemological claim is understood also as a "linguistic"
articulation, as a rhetorical fact. 84 It is possible to trace a "history"
of being by addressing the gaps and the ruptures which we can
experience with art, 85 and it is also possible to understand the
thought of dialectics and of difference as two distinct though not
radically different manifestations of the decline of being in the
age of technology. 86
In order to see how it all comes together, we must introduce
one more important term from Vattimo's vocabulary: Verwindung.
With this term, which he retrieves and develops from a Heidegger
text, 87 Vattimo establishes certain tenets which go into making of
a weak ontology. The category of "overcoming" is the fruit and
destiny of what we call the Modern; it cannot be "thought" of as
capable of bringing us into the postmodern. Predicated under the
sign of the novum, fiercely deductive about its undemonstrable
origins and the existence of a superior truth, "overcoming" as
Ueberwindung must now be declined through the thought of differ-
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ence. In this fashion, dialectics would experience the lability of
the ideas of eternity, as well as dismiss the pretextuos right to
accede to the ontos on. It would open up to the abyss which makes
re-calling the only viable direction for thought to take. But here
my own metaphors are already sketching the picture. Thought
must take a path, and this path is demarcated by the language of
beings that have been, by humans who existed. If the foundation
is no longer there, we are not necessarily doomed to sink into
void irreal. It is all a question of taking the notions of God, Truth,
and other immutables as words, as points of view, as Nietzsche
revealed. And it is all a question of acknowledging the cogency
of Heidegger's claim that thought can only err and wander but
cannot ever hope of "leaving metaphysics behind." What we are
left with are the monuments, the "works" (the opere), and the
linguistic heritage of attempts at overcoming. Heidegger's use of
Verwindung suggests "acceptance" and "deep reflection," which
is closely tied to his notion of thinking as An-denken, recalling,
rememoration, as we saw above. To this Vattimo now adds the
full range of other meanings possible in German, which include
the ideas of recovery (as from an illness, convalescence) and distortion.88
Weak ontology is thus not a thought of metaphysics in a
particular crisis, to which carefully contrived strategies can submit
a solution or an alternative. Analogously to Derridian deconstruction, 89 but obviously on a different track, it holds that there's no
getting out of this form of thinking (basically: Hellenism and JudeoChristianity). It acknowledges the historical existence of canons
and events of thought but primarily as something that has beenlived
which can only be addressed in the second degree, so to speak,
because there's an existential-experiential component to being
which is pointed forward in time. And the thematic of "beingtowards-death" runs through other writings of Vattimo, and occasionally of Carchia, Rovatti and Comolli as well. In this light, it
cannot but understand in a distanced, partial and necessarily "impure" fashion. Thus thinking also recognizes the partiality and
transitoriness of that "nextness" of the living human which, however, now essays to be heard. Among its traits, in fact, we must
include its being a thought of fruition, of re-living, of aesthetic
experience, and not of the "new," the emancipatory, and the
superior. Weak thought is a thought of "contamination" which is
the direct result of the Verwindung: resignation means also to resign, to mark off with an "other" new sign something which has
been handed down and which confronts us. And finally, weak
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thought is informed by the Ge-Stell, the "enframing" or "im-position"90 of the technological reality of the West which is nevertheless always on the verge of disclosing the Ereignis, the event of
being. 91 The importance attributed to the temporality of the present means that, from a hermeneutic perspective, the discourse
of science and technology is actually more important than the
celebrative and reassuring humanism of the past. "Weak
thought . . . no longer has reason to lay claim to the sovereignty
which metaphysical thought claimed with respect to praxis" (2627). The possibilities of theory are reduced to a less anxious and
localized field in continuous flux and mutation, while the range
of critical methods is made to coincide with the rhetorical reality
of their transmission.
14. Weak thought is also a learning disposition, atteggiamento
conoscitivoas Rovatti calls it (42), but it should not be considered

one way of knowing among others, or that it is "epistemological":
its disposition, its attitude invests the entirety of experience. The
attack on strong thought" is directed specifically at the speculative
correspondence between the knower and the known. What
Nietzsche had advocated, however, was the possibility of losing
oneself, of rolling away from the center towards an x. Drawing
on the thought of Michel Serres, our identity as subject is to be
sought in the movement, the going around, randonnee,reconquering a sensitivity to, and a sensibility for, chaos, chance, risk. A
weak ontology requires, according to Rovatti, that notions of "subject" and "object" be loosened from normative and universally
valid moorings and be set afloat as if in exile, " 92fully aware of the
dynamics between chance and necessity . For Rovatti the "eternal
recurrence" itself is nothing more than another "necessity." To
try to keep it in abeyance means to bend and suffer under its iron
laws. But if we work it from the inside, if we face up to its existence,
then the nothingness which constitutes us is no longer a threat.
For now we can say something about it. The same holds for chance:
we can refrain from acting before its horrible unpredictability, but
we can also think of it as a flux, a game which can occupy us
immensely if we decide to "figure out" its rules.
There's a strain of nihilism that binds this to most of the other
essays in the book, an active" nihilism responsible for the
emergence of a philosophical consciousness or ideology which
takes notions such as the transvaluation of all values, the absence
of metaphysical foundations, and the dynamics of localized
phenomena as a reaching out towards greater horizons of action
II

II

II
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and legitimation 93 seriously enough to inform the very possibility
of thinking. For Alessandro Dal Lago and Franco Crespi, for example, nihilism and the indeterminacy that belie the discourse of
ethics and social theory are the starting point for any articulation
which, in attempting to situate and exercise its limited and personal freedom, cannot at any time ignore the rules of social comportment and the masked tendencies to absolutization which
prompted the very possibility of a manifold presence, a real threat
to anyone who espouses the cause of eternity. 94
As for the other essays, each is dialogically engaged with the
thought of a particular author, 95 in what may appear as an instictive reflex to find and consecrate precursors. But the overall picture
points to a set of conditions that alter radically the status of literary
hermeneutics and interpretation in general. Above all, I believe,
is the valorization of writing and making/doing literature as a
social and political act no less tangible and true than the institutionally legitimated discourses that gravitate towards the sciences,
mathematics, philosophy itself in its broadest sense. The contribution by Comolli is in fact a "new" type of literary criticism, one
informed by both a phenomenological-ontological inquiry and an
aesthetic and poetic sublimation of creation and invention, that
is to say, by writing as if a Writer, and respondingto an artist. Since
it is informed not by grammatology but by the thought of difference, it deals with and speaks to the very issue of language and
understanding,
without playing metonymic and parodistic
games. 96 It is a reading of a Kafkan text triggered by a real-life
experience in which the coincidence of certain conditions flashed
by the mind-by
"memory," Comolli writes-an
image of K.
through the snow at dusk. Though one might say Comolli' s "style"
is Heideggerian, the essay does not begin with a poetic or
"philosophic" question, but with a concrete and minute real-life
detail which is then inscribed into a philosophical reflection on
time, transposition, figures, and the linguisticalness of experience.
It has transformed criticism into a philosophical novella.

15. The inescapable conclusion one draws is that weak thought
is expanding hermeneutics to the level of a degrounded, nomad
discourse whose main commitment is to the microdetail of the
existential present. Literature, then, regains a social purpose as
interpreter and shaper of forms of thinking, therefore of acting.
If some of the authors in the Weak Thought anthology appear well
disposed towards making philosophy a form of literature, it is
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because interpretive discourse need no longer be authorized, legitimated and verified by Classical Reason, or by the Platonic logos, or
any totalizing and foundational belief or power. Interpretive discourse now takes the many "reasons" of our contemporary epistemological pluralism (or anarchism) as no more and no less than
rhetorical constructs which "survive" through cultural changes.
What happens to the theory-method relation that we took as
a basic requirement of all interpretation? On the theory side, the
weakening of being entails the awareness that critical positions
are multiple yet also circumscribed as to time and place; that the
legitimizing principles are now norms at hand, at times invented
in loco, at times motivated even as reactions/comments to peculiar
experiences and thoughts; and finally, that rhetorics-the rhetoric
of the disciplines, and rhetorics as philosophy -is emerging as
an all too important aspect of interpretation. 97 There is no doubt
that weak thought can be interpreted in different ways, 98 yet its
contribution to hermeneutics cannot go unnoticed. In confirming
the theory-method relation posited at the beginning, it also expands it to make each term more pliable, more rhetorically sensitive to the occasion of the text's coming into being, dialogically
predisposed towards the other person, accepting to listen. The
implications of weak thought for political, ethical and sociological
discourse can only be ascertained in the long term, in view of the
fact that, as some of the authors point out, it frees a radical element
which shakes the very foundations of the systematic, organic and
productive styles of these disciplines. Moreover, not enough attention is paid to the question of women (and/or feminism), and
critics will certainly ask about ramifications concerning the notions
of history and the state. We will have to wait and see. But at the
existential and hermeneutic level, its relevance is inestimable: it
listens to contingency and reasonableness, it refracts the nihilism
of experience, it manifests a will to tread over boundaries and
relocate as appropriate, it speaks as desired. Hardly nostalgic or
apologetic, it breathes sotto voce notions of authenticity and paints
chiaroscuro scapes of being in the world.
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1. Aldo Gargani, ed., Crisi dellaragione(Torino: Einaudi, 1979), 366 pp. The
ten essays are by Gargani, Carlo Ginsburg, Giulio Lepschy, Francesco Orlando,
Franco Rella, Vittoria Strada, Remo Bodei, Nicola Badaloni, Salvatore Veca, and
Carlo Augusto Viano. All translations are my own.
2. I have given a preliminary approximation to the issue in an article titled
"Beyond the Ancient Diaphora: Sketch of a Postmodern Theory of Interpretation
as Dialogue," first read at Cerisy-la-Salle in September, 1983, as part of the
symposium on "La postmodernite en art et philosophie," and later printed with
the proceedings in Krisis (Houston), No. 3-4 (1985), pp. 112-28. The two paragraphs that follow this note, however, are taken from the abstract of my book,
presently with an American publisher, The Elusive Hermes: Critical Method and
the Philosophyof Interpretation,which studies the relationship between method,
theory, rhetorics and hermeneutics from Plato through Gadamer. The present
paper is written in the same field and spirit of inquiry but, though relying
on-and in a sense extending-this
book for its historical and theoretical claims,
it is actually a chapter in an ongoing project which deals exclusively with the
Italian panorama, provisionally titled InterpretiveThresholds:Criticismand Interpre-

tation in Italy 1960-1985.
3. Aldo Gargani, II saperesenzafondamenti;la condottaintellettualecomestruttura-zionedell esperienzacomune (Torino: Einaudi, 1975).
4. Ibid., p. 5.
5. Ibid., p. 8.
6. Gargani's argument sounds very close to Kuhn, as when he writes:
"One scientific discipline does not replace another one without altering the
latter's objectual statute, that is, its rules and practical categories of the concept
of 'object'; nor can it ignore the system of norms, validity and legitimation that
scientific statements must conform to. Each scientific doctrine establishes its
own theorems by building a new grammatic model of objectivity and a new
system of verification and operative strategies on the ashes of the objectual
models and the operative paradigms of the supplanted theories"; pp. 5-6, one
is reminded of Thomas S. Kuhn, who, in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
(Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1975 [1962]), actually believes the "ashes" to
be more like "bricks," as when he writes: "the new paradigm must promise to
preserve a relatively large part of the concrete problem-solving ability that has
accrued to science through its predecessors. Novelty for its own sake is not a
desideratum in the sciences as it is in so many other creative fields. As a result,
though new paradigms seldom or never possess all the capabilities of their
predecessors, they usually preserve a great deal of the most concrete parts of
past achievement and they always permit additional concrete problem-solutions
besides" (p. 169). Gargani was investigating the tautological nature of scientific
"doctrines" or "paradigms." However, there's no mention of Kuhn in this 1975
book and I surmise that they were working on similar topics unaware of each
other. Also not mentioned is Paul Feyerabend, whose Against Method came out
in 1975 (and in Italian translation in 1979). The relationship between method (as
epistemology) and ontology, which I originally derived from Husserl, Heidegger
and Levinas, appears only as a backgroundissue in Kuhn, op. cit. ("Postscript,"
1969), p. 206, but see also pp. 168-71.; in the same context, see R. Rorty, Philosophy
and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1980), VII (esp. p.
325); and, among the authors present in Crisi della ragione, the articles by Remo
Bodei and Salvatore Veca.
7. Aldo Gargani, II saperesenza fondamenti, p. 80.
8. The problems discussed by Feyerabend are of course of a slightly different nature, and we need not get into the Kuhn, Feyerabend, Lakatos polemics.
Our interest here is more generalin that what is sought is the external or at any rate
de-limitinghorizon of methodvia the discourse of its own explication or legitimation.
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9. Whether in good or bad faith, that is not at issue here. The question of
good or bad faith raises the specters of consciousness, values and intersubjectivity, which are systematically excluded from the rationalist and scientific enterprise for not being the "serious and important 'cognitive' part (the part in which
we meet our obligation to rationality)" and belonging perhaps to "hermeneutics,"
which "is charged with everything else." I am citing from R. Rorty, Philosophyand
the Mirror of Nature, pp. 318-19. My use of Rorty's distinction between epistemology and hermeneutics is in a very broad, mostly figurative sense.
10. See Feyerabend, Against Method (NLB, 1975), par.17. This hypothesis
can be extremely fruitful if approached from the standpoint of Rhetorics with a
view to the hermeneutical implications it can have. It would certainly constitute
a point of rupture, the escape point in a network or membrane, a channel
between epistemology and hermeneutics or between theory and method.
11. Cited in Gargani, "Introduction" to Crisi dell ragione, pp. 22-23. In On
the Method of TheoreticalPhysics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933), p. 6, Einstein
says that pure, logical thought cannot give us any knowledge of the world of
experience: all knowledge of reality begins in experience and ends with experience. As far as reality is concerned, conclusions obtained by means of purely
rational procedures are entirely vacuous. See also Werner Heisenberg, Across
the Frontiers(New York: Harper & Row, 1974), Chapter 1 et infra.
12. Croce's works, especially his Aesthetics (1901-02), the book on Hegel
(1906) and the Logic(1905), are in fact a theoretical and ideologically systematizing
response to turn-of-the-century crises, especially in history, science and interpretation theory, and influenced Italian and European thought for over half a century. His almost complete remotion from the Italian philosophical debate of the
past twenty-five years may well constitute a needed chapter in cultural history
(for, in subliminal ways, his presence is still active and determining). The
"reasons" for his repudiation by critics and philosophers in the late fifties and
through the sixties are discussed in my Interpretive Thresholds(see note 2).
13. Crisi, p. 50. That Gargani turns to authors like Musil, Hofmannsthal,
Kafka, Dostoievski to make the figurataive point of illustrating the Crisis of
Classical Reason is important in a number of ways, not least being the fact that
the Italian philosopher's subsequent works have explored in detail this particular
juncture between epistemology and fiction and have contributed immensely to
an understanding of the interim space between the procedures of the mind and
the actual execution of action (especially, once again, as Rhetorics, which is not,
however, specifically thematized by Gargani). See his Freud, Wittgenstein, Musil
(Milano: Shakespeare & Co., 1982), especially the last chapter which is a "conversation," pp. 106-27.
14. In Italian in Miti emblemispie (Torino: Einaudi, 1986); in English it first
appeared in History Workshop,9, Spring (1980), pp. 5-36, then in U. Eco and T.
Sebeok, eds., The Sign of Three(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983). See
also Ginsburg's TheCheeseand the Worms (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980).
15. Ginsburg in Crisi della ragione,pp. 62-66.
16. The indexical or clue-motivated paradigm is also called by Ginsburg
divinatorio,which entails guessing and forecasting a future set of events. In this
Ginsburg distances himself from Sebastiano Timpanaro--The FreudianSlip, 1976
[1974]-by insisting that perhaps what ought to be revived or re-explored is
precisely this connection between epistemologically inspired disciplines and a
knowing of a "magical" or "divinatory" type. Ginsburg does not mention Vico's
New Scienceas a primary text of research in this direction, nor does he cite sources
in the hermeneutic tradition which have already addressed the issue. Concerning
this latter point, Gianni Vattimo was justifiably surprised, as we'll see further
down, in sec. 9.
17. Again, Ginsburg's analysis seems wide open to a hermeneutic conversation, especially for the ontological and phenomenological assumptions it harks
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back to without thematizing them. More than that, it is this necessary "included
third" (medic, judge, prophet) that needs further exploration in view of an
interpretive discourse that begins with an account of the theory-method (the
hermeneutics-epistemology)
relation. On the other hand, on the basis of his
other theoretical writings--see Miti, emblemi, spie-he seems to prefer more
"typological" and "semiotic" approaches to inquiry, and more recently he has
been inspired by Propp and Freud.
18. Ibid., pp. 71-72.
19. See "Abduction and Induction," in C.S. Peirce, CollectedPapers, 6.522
[reprinted in PhilosophicalWriting of Peirce,edited by J.Buchler (New York: Dover,
1955), pp. 150-56]. This is my observation, not Ginsburg's. Because Ginsburg's
analysis seems to me simultaneously open to both semiotics and hermeneutics
(albeit of a "Peircian" kind), it is important to consider the Modem origins of
these two disciplines at a moment (coincidence?) when there's developing a
variously articulated historical "crisis of reason"; and Peirce's work certainly
embodies one of the most important efforts in seeing through this (or any!) crisis.
See Massimo Bonfantini, "Introduzione" to C.S. Peirce Le leggidell' ipotesi[anthology from the CollectedPapers](Milano: Bompiani, 1984), pp. 7-30; and, for a more
radical assessment of Peirce's work in relation to a hermeneutics of the sign,
Carlo Sini, Semioticae filosofia (Bologna: II Mulino: 1978), Ch. I, pp. 11-102; and,
also by Sini, Passareil segno (Milano: II Saggiatore, 1981), Part One, pp. 11-60
20. See above, note 6.
21. Carlo Augusto Viano, "Reason, Abundance, Belief," in Crisi, pp. 303-66.
22. Much as we saw above at the end of section 3, when Gargani points
out how the faltering of the Classical Model spurs thinkers to envision other
"philosophies," here again the tacit backdrop to Viano' s study are the enormous
efforts of thinkers like Labriola, Lenin, Dilthey, Husserl, Russell and Whitehead,
Saussure who sought to force, change or readapt reason and its methodological
extension to new or different sectors of inquiry and areas of reality.
23. See the highly stimulating Derridian-Feyerabendian reading of Darwin
by George Levine, "Darwin, the Problem of Authority," in Raritan, Vol. 3, No.
3 (Winter 1984), pp. 30-61.
24. See Werner Heisenberg, Across the Frontiers, Chs. 2, 4, 12, 14.
25. Jean-Franc;ois Lyotard, in particular, makes a case for contrast (conflict)
and untranslatability between different families of sentences, a situation which
ought to be of interest simultaneously to Law, Politics, Literary Studies and Interpretation Theory because we are confronted, from the beginning, with the problem
of power, legitimation and judgment; see Le Differend (Paris: Minuit, 1983). The
Italian translation of this text-Feltrinelli, 1985-apparently got a cool reception.
26. See, among others, Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition (Minneapolis:
Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1984 [19791).
27. See the brilliant critical exposition of this debate (which goes much
further than the relatively superficial C. P. Snow booklet by the same title published in 1963 [Italian translation: Milano, 19641), by philosopher Giulio Preti,
Retorica e Logica (Torino: Einaudi, 1974 [19681), whose historical reconstruction
and analyses anticipate those in the Crisi del sapere, as well as some chapters in
Rorty's Philosophyand the Mirror of Nature.
28. See William Spanos, "The Appollonian Investment of Modem Humanist
Education," in Cultural Critique, No. 1 (Fall 1985), pp. 7-72; and in Cultural
Critique, No. 2 (Winter 1985-86), pp. 105-34. Also, many of his articles as they
appeared in Boundary 2. The seminal thinker behind this is of course Michel
Foucault: see The Micro-physicsof Power, Disciplineand Punishment and other (even
earlier) texts.
29. I am deliberately generalizing a common denominator for science and
technology for the sake of clarity and brevity. I am not unaware of how this
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relationship constitutes a central philosophical problem in our times, beginning
with Heidegger and on through the works of Barrett, Habermas, Schurmann,
Vattimo, Ihde, and others.
30. I am thinking of works which, above and beyond their differences (no
pun intended), seem to favor a de-centering, de-stabilizing approach to the Great
Metaphysical Canons; for Vattimo, see Al di la del soggetto (Milano: Feltrinelli,
1984 [1981), esp. pp. 7-26 and 51-74; and the essay in Norberto Bobbio et al.,
Checosafanno oggii filosofi(Milano: Bompiani, [1980)), pp. 185-97. For Schurmann,
Le principed'anarchie(Paris: Seuil, 1982), esp. Chs. III and IV. For Derrida, Marges
de la philosophie(Paris: Minuit, 1972), and several essays from his other books.
31. Viano, in Crisi della ragione, p. 349.
32. Salvatore Veca, "Modes of Reason," in Crisi della ragione, pp. 281-302.
33. Ibid., pp. 293, 297 et infra, which sounds very much like Ginsburg. op.
cit., p. 99 and elsewhere (see above, sec. 4).
34. Ibid., p. 300.
35. Giulio Lepschy, "Linguistics, Science and Rationality," in Crisi della
ragione, 107-25.
36. Franco Rella, "The Discrediting of Reason," in Crisi della ragione, pp.
149-77.
37. Vittorio Strada, "Interpretation and Change," in Crisi della ragione,pp.
179-96; original title is actually Interpretaree trasformare.
38. Nicola Badaloni, "Reason and Change [Ragione e mutamento]," in Crisi
della ragione,pp. 241-78.
39. Remo Bodei, "To Comprehend, To Modify: Models and Perspectives of
a Transforming Rationality," in Crisi della ragione,pp. 197-240.
40. See Bodei's article "Beyond Dialectical Thinking: Political Logics and
the Construction of Individuality," in GraduateFaculty PhilosophyJournal, Vol.
10, No. 1 (1985), pp. 123-40. In this issue there are also papers by Vattimo,
"Dialectics, Difference, Weak Thought," pp. 151-64; Giorgio Agamben, "The
Idea of Language; On Some Difficulties in Speaking about Language," pp. 141-50;
and Mario Perniola, "The Difference of the Italian Philosophical Culture," pp.
103-16, which were read originally at a Symposium held at New York University,
Nov. 3-5, 1983, titled The UnperfectActor: Critique of Ideologyand Hermeneuticsin

ContemporaryItalian Thought.
41. Bodei in Crisi della ragione, p. 234.
42. Ibid., p. 236.
43. Mario Vegetti, "The Power of Abstraction and the Knowledge of Subjects," in Aut-Aut, 175-76, gennaio, 1980, 5-18.
44. Ibid., p. 7.
45. Pier Aldo Rovatti, "The Repositioning [dislocazione] of Contradiction
and Individual Knowledge," in Aut-Aut, op. cit., pp . 27-40.
46. Gianni Vattimo, "The Shadow of Neorationalism," in Aut-Aut, op. cit.,
pp. 19-26.
47. See Bodei's "To Comprehend, To Modify," in Crisi, pp. 229.
48. See the essay "Dialectics, Difference, Weak Thought," mentioned in
note 40, which is also the lead essay in Gianni Vattimo, Pier Aldo Rovatti, eds.,
Il pensierodebole(Milano: Feltrinelli, 1983), pp. 12-28. This will be explored in
detail in part three of the present study .
49. Vattimo in Aut-Aut, op. cit., p. 25.
50. Marxian and Marxist method(ology), and the historical and ontological
claims it advances, are discussed in great detail in one of the central chapters
of the announced InterpretiveThresholds(see note 2), with particular reference to
the works of Marx, Labriola, Gramsci, Lukacs, Della Volpe, Goldmann and
Italian Marxist critics of the sixties and the seventies. For an assessment of the
Crisianthology in relation to Marxism and feminism, see Renate Holub, "Towards
a New Rationality?" in Discourse,No. 4, 1982, pp. 89-106.
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51. This is analyzed in depth in my forthcoming The ElusiveHermes(cf. n. 2).
52. From this to a reflection of the value and importance of Pragmatism for
interpretive discourse the road is brief, especially as the notions of truth and
meaning are ultimately grounded upon realconsequence. Terms like concretization, effect (Wirkung) and consequence (esito in Italian) seem to lead parallel
lives, and should spur research on the common concerns of Hermeneutics and
Pragmatism. In particular, it is the dynamics between the idea and the fact (the
reading and the writing, we might even say) of a great work that ought to be
seen as the problem in interpretation, an in-between which appears as the intelligible horizon (containing idea and fact) as well as the totality of its possible
articulation (ergo: rhetorics). Besides the above-quoted Rorty, see Peirce, "How
to Make Our Ideas Clear," in PhilosophicalWritings, pp. 23-24; H.S. Thayer "Pragmatism: A Reinterpretation of the Origins and Consequences," in Mulvaney and
Zeltner, eds., Pragmatism: Its Sources and Prospects (Columbia, S.C.: Univ. of
South Carolina Press, 1981), pp. 1-20 But see also Part III of this study.
53. Parts I and II of The ElusiveHermesdeal precisely with these questions.
54. Francesco Orlando, "Enlightenment Rhetoric and Freudian Negation,"
in Crisi de/la ragione, pp. 127-45. See his Toward a Freudian Theory of Literature
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1978 [1973]), pp. 3-7, 123-36 et infra. This
and other psychocriticisms are discussed in Interpretive Thresholds(see note 2).
It can be asserted that the structural-linguistic approach to Freudian psychology,
which counted legions in the sixties and through the seventies in France, Italy
and the United States, especially in literary criticism, still exhibited a dualistic,
oppositional, rational architecture which historically goes back to Locke. For
Joseph F. Rychlak, The Psychologyof RigorousHumanism (New York: Wiley, 1977),
the possibilities of a theory-method relation can and must be expanded if only
we deploy, next to the "winning" Lockean model or "paradigm," Kantian "telic"
formulations and "theories"! Indeed, I feel we must expand even beyond the
Kantian paradigm (modern structuralism has also deep roots in neo-Kantian
thought, as we read in G. Puglisi, Che cosaela strutturalismo [Roma: Astrolabio,
1970], pp. 63-81), as Nietzsche, Heidegger, Lacan and others have suggested.
55. I am speaking of areas of interest or disciplines that are crucial to interpretive discourse and to literary interpretation in particular, each of which can make
a legitimate claim to its own history, its own special metalanguage and system
of cultural codes. When we interpret a passage from Dante's Commedia,as when
we assess the relative value of a recent best-seller with a group of students, we
refer invariably to the tradition of the work, to whether it is good (or "beautiful"!),
if it has any political message (and some still argue, belated decadents, that
politics doesn't matter to art), what the author "meant," ergo the intentional
consciousness of a person (perhaps long dead), finally the author's (and, for the
raffinati, the text's) social life and fortune, and what value to attribute to it. Now
all this is fine and hermeneutically coherent, except that we cannot in each of
these instances adopt a scientific method whose statements, or grid of valid
operations, condition the very possibility of the articulation: Just think of the
apparently unrelated contributions of Husserl and Heisenberg! Interpretation,
literary criticism, must be able to speak to and speak of the work in question,
and that means an alignment along paths and channels not always, or not
necessarily derived from (and then slavishly adhered to) the hard sciences or
from "official" rationalism. As the old Stilkritik knew well, a critic has to be a
historian, a linguist, a philosopher and a "scientist." (As late as 1947 Gianfranco
Contini exhorted his humanist colleagues to go out and study, also, the methods of
biology, the discoveries of the sciences, and learn "rigorous, scientific" thinking
and methods of research. I should simply like to add that, ironically, by the sixties
literary critics seemed to know only scientific models of research and interpretation.
56. In the early 1930s there forms a "Milan School" of philosophy under
the teaching of Antonio Banfi, who had done earlier studies with and on the
neo-Kantian school, Husserl as well as Simmel. Among the "banfiani," very
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important and influential were Enzo Paci, Giulio Preti, Dino Formaggio and
Luciano Anceschi.
57. "Strategies" is to be understood more in terms of Wittgenstein than of
Derrida, whose influence in Italy is very limited.
58. Ervin Laszlo, Introductionto Systems Philosophy(New York: Harper, 1972),
p. 16.
59. Gianni Vattimo and Pier Aldo Rovatti, eds. II pensierodebole,op cit. The
contributins to the volume, besides those by the editors, are by Leonardo
Amoroso, Gianni Carchia, Giampiero Comolli, Filippo Costa, Franco Crespi,
Alessandro Dal Lago, Umberto Eco, Maurizio Ferraris, and Diego Marconi. An
English translation of this book is forthcoming from Johns Hopkins University
Press. As was the case with the Crisibook, given the diversity, range and breadth
of themes and authors contained in Weak Thought, I will focus only on certain
areas germane to my argument. All translations are my own; citations/references
are to the Italian edition and will be indicated in my text by page number.
60. I am thinking in particular of the work of Aldo Gargani, Remo Bodei
and Salvatore Veca.
61. Unberto Eco, Trattatodi semioticagenerale(Milano: Bompiani, 1975); English version, A Theory of Semiotics (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1976). It
must be said, however, that prior to his work on semiotics (formerly: semiology),
Eco had already developed a flexible, "open," non-dogmatic approach to interpretation in Opera Aperta (Milano: Bompiani, 1962), which was informed at
the same time by Pareyson's aesthetics, phenomenology, Riegl's notion of
Kunstwollen and information theory.
62. Translated and republished in Umberto Eco, Travels in Hyper Reality
(New York: Harcourt, 1986).
63. Cf. Trattato, 2.12, pp. 173-77. Also, the notion of "Global Semantic Space
['System' in the English version]," 2.13, pp. 178-182.
64. Ibid., 2.15, pp. 196-200.
65. Ibid., 3.6.9, pp. 320-24 et infra.
66. Unberto Eco, Lectorin fabula;la cooperazioneinterpretativanei testi narrativi
(Milano: Bompiani, 1979). The English version includes other essays and bears
the just as symptomatic title of The Role of the Reader(Bloomington: Indiana Univ.
Press, 1979).
67. Ibid., 2.8, pp. 44-46, et infra. Cf. also "lntroduzione," pp. 8-9.
68. Umberto Eco, Semioticae filosofiadel linguaggio (Torino: Einaudi, 1984);
English translation, Semioticsand the Philosophyof Language(Bloomington: Indiana
Univ. Press, 1984).
69. Ibid., 1.13, p. 51.
70. Cf. also article in this issue for the active role of the reader in textual
sign production. Pragmatics is a terrain where semiotics and hermeneutics meet.
71. Here Eco demonstrates how even such a paradigmatic text on the problem of definitions, which would have all the trimmings of a "strong" axiomatic
and hierarchical idea of reason behind it, is ultimately undermined from the
inside and deals only with "differences" and "accidents" originating not in formal
substance, but in real-world knowledge, in extra-rational, or extra-methodic
territory. Cf. pp. 70-73.
72. Gianni Vattimo, Le avventure delladifferenza;che cosasignificapensaredopo
Nietzsche e Heidegger(Milano: Garzanti, 1980). I will be referring mainly to the
essays "Ragione ermeneutica e ragione dialettica," pp. 15-43; "Nietzsche e la
differenza," pp. 71-94; "An-denken. 11pensare e il fondamento," pp. 123-49;
and "Le avventure della differenza," pp. 151-71.
73. This problem is amply treated in my forthcoming The Elusive Hermes;
cf. note 2. Owing to lack of space, I have left out Vattimo's "positive" assessment
of other aspects of ontological hermeneutics.
74. Vattimo refers to the Sartre of The Critique of DialecticalReasonin which
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is postulated the necessity to think of a coincidence between experience and
history, but where the latter is not seen as malaise. Sartre recurs frequently in
Vattimo's recent writings.
75. See also Vattimo's comments on Deleuze's "strong" and "affirmative"
philosophical underpinnings in Al di la' del soggetto, op cit., p. 43.
76. The obvious reference is to Heidegger's Identity and Difference.
77. See M. Heidegger, Early Greek Thinking, trans. D. F. Krell and F. A.
Capuzzi (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1984), pp. 48-55.
78. Ibid.: "'!fo use' ... suggests: to let something present come to presence
as such; frui, to brook, to use, usage, means: to hand something over to its own
essence and to keep it in hand, preserving it as something present ....
Usage
delivers what is present to its presencing, i.e. to its lingering. Usage dispenses
to what is present the portion of its while. The while apportioned in each case
to what lingers rests in the jointure which joins what is present in the transition
between twofold absence (arrival and departure). The jointure of the while
bounds and confines what is present as such" (53). However, as "dispenser of
portions of jointure," usage conjoins order and reek, thus establishing boundaries
which are not to be understood as de-limiting or as distinguishing between
concrete states or entities. For "as to creonit is therefore at the same time apeiron,
that which is without boundary, since its essence consists in sending boundaries
of the while to whatever lingers awhile in presence" (54). The value of this for
a thought of difference which, not oblivious to Being, yet intends to be rooted
in its historicity, is clear: it paves the way for an understanding of the temporal
Da-seinas what the later Heidegger calls Ereignis,event, the 'taking place' of the
disclosure of Being.
79. Ibid., p. 54.
80. Ibid., p. 55.
81. See especially Al di la del soggetto, pp. 27-50, where, in commenting on
a fragment from 1885-87 in which Nietzsche speaks of the interpreter's self-transcending task, Selbstverneinen,Sichselbstueberwinden,and of the necessity to act,
even while "experimenting" interpretation, according to some however negligible
normative criterion, Vattimo writes: "It is true that the rigidity of communication
codes, and of any type of code, has long been necessitated by the needs of the
organization of labor. This rigidity, today, can be slackened, for we have already
witnessed the death of God and the fall of every metaphysical structure of the
universe" (46).
82. See on this topic his recent paper, "The Problem of Subjectivity from
Nietzsche to Heidegger," in Differentia1 (Autumn 1986), pp. 5-22.
83. Al di la de/ soggetto, op. cit., p. 38.
84. See the essay "Verita e retorica nell'ontologia ermeneutica" in La fine
della modernita;Nichilismo ed ermeneuticanella cultura post-moderna(Milano: Garzanti, 1985), pp. 138-52.
85. See Vattimo's essays on the avant-gardes in his Poesiae ontologia(Milano:
Mursia, 1984).
86. Vattimo claims that in the twentieth century, dialectics has developed
"a dissolutive tendency which the dialectical scheme cannot control any longer:
this tendency is perceivable in Benjamin's micrology, in Adorno's negativity and
in Bloch's utopism" (17).
87. Vattimo writes that the term Verwindung appears once in Holzwegeand
in Vortrageund Aufsiitze, but is developed (especially with reference to Heidegger's Ueberwinden)in Identitiit und Differenz. See his full analysis in "Nichilismo
e postmoderno in filosofia" contained in Lafine deIlamodernita,op. cit., pp. 172-89.
88. This notion is hermeneutically related to the idea of historicity as transmission, Ueberlieferung,of messages which are always already "interpretation."
As such, they are "twisted" or "distorted" each and every time they are "recalled"
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by the interpreter. This perspective, explored elsewhere by Vattimo with reference to Gadamer, can serve as a bridge to a fruitful dialogue with Reception
Theory, especially as regards the notion of Wirkungsgeschichte.
89. Of the authors in the anthology, Maurizio Ferraris, "The Aging of the
School of Suspicion," pp. 120-36, writes of the similarities between deconstruction and weak ontology in view of the "parasitic double bind" between grammatology and metaphysics. On Derrida's critical reception, especially in Italy,
see also by Ferraris, "Derrida 1975-1985. Sviluppi teorici e fortuna filosofica,"
Nuova Corrente3 (1984), pp. 351-78.
90. This is Vattimo's suggestion for the Italian version, imposizione,which
I think works in English as well.
91. See also La fine de/la modernita,op. cit., pp. 34 and 179.
92. Rovatti's specific reference here is to Lacan's seminar from 1972-73,
Encore,in which he speaks of love as "the encounter of two exhiled traces." Cf.
pp. 39-40. See also his La pasta in gioco (Milano: Bompiani, 1987).
93. Rovatti has written extensively on the social, political and psychoanalytical aspects of these dynamics.
94. Cf. A. Dal Lago, "The Ethics of Weakness: Simone Weil and Nihilism,"
pp. 91-119; and F. Crespi, "Absence of Foundations and Social Project," pp.
243-59.
95. For instance, a close reading of Hegel (the Logic) by G. Carchia, "In
Praise of Appearance," pp. 81-90; a Heideggerian reading of Heidegger through
Virgil by L. Amoroso, "Heidegger's Lichtung as lucus a (non) lucendo,"pp. 137-63;
Wittgenstein by Diego Marconi, pp. 164-80; both the essays by G. Comolli and
F. Costa deal with Kafka.
96. For a critique of parody and deconstruction in Hillis Miller and Geoffrey
Hartman (but written before my acquaintance with weak thought), see my
"Malinconia Bianca; L'Interrnundium di Yale," in Peter Carravetta and Paolo
Spedicato, eds., Postmodernoe filosofia;percorsie visioni della critica in America
(Milano: Bompiani, 1984), pp. 183-227.
97. This is explored in detail in Part Three of The ElusiveHermes. The authors
"in between" rhetorics and philosophy analyzed are Chaim Perelman, Paul
Ricoeur, Paolo Valesio and Ernesto Grassi.
98. Besides the newspaper reviews when the book came out, and the scathing critique by Carlo Augusto Viano now contained in Va' pensiero;il carattere
della filosofia italiana contemporanea(Turin: Einaudi, 1985), see also articles by
Stefano Rosso, "Postmodern Italy: Notes on the 'Crisis of Reason,' 'Weak
Thought,' and The Name of the Rose," (contains an extensive bibliography), in D.
Fokkema and H. Bertens, eds., ApproachingPostmodernism(Philadelphia: Benjamins, 1986); Mario Perniola, "Lettera sul pensiero debole," Alfabeta 58 (1984);
Reiner Schiirrnann, "Deconstruction is not Enough," GraduateFaculty Philosophy
Journal 10, 1 (1985); and Giovanna Borradori, "Italian Weak Thought and Postmodernism," SocialText 18 (1987/88).

